Experimental evidence on determinants of support for nuclear use in response to threats of nuclear retaliation.

Self Cite

How does the alliance between a client state and its nuclear ally influence support for proliferation in the client? Conventional wisdom suggests that when nuclear security guarantees are not credible, support for proliferation will be high, since a domestic nuclear capability offers an alternative source of deterrence. I introduce a new theory, which posits that highly credible security guarantees can backfire by causing some individuals to fear their ally might miscalculate—either by using nuclear weapons in an unnecessary preventative attack or by precipitous escalation of a crisis or conflict. Survey experiments conducted among representative samples of South Korean citizens in 2018 and 2019 support this theory, showing that increases in the credibility of the US nuclear security guarantee lead to increased support for nuclear proliferation among South Korean respondents.

Section: Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea

Sukin

2019

Self Cite

“…A symmetric nuclear crisis involves two nuclear-armed actors. Previous experiments by Koch and Wells (2021) and Sukin (2020b) dealt with nuclear-armed adversaries of the United States, which we classify as symmetric nuclear crises.…”

Section: Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Crisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Koch and Wells (2021) find US public support for a nuclear first-strike on an unnamed adversary decreases as nuclear retaliation becomes more plausible. Sukin (2020b) concludes the opposite, showing Americans and South Koreans become more likely to support nuclear first-use amid a conventional conflict if Russia or North Korea threaten nuclear retaliation. Both studies present noteworthy and interesting findings to build upon.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Under the Umbrella: Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion

Allison

Herzog

2022

How robust is public support for extended nuclear deterrence in patron and client states? Recent studies have improved scholarly understanding of US public opinion about nuclear weapon use against non-nuclear adversaries. Yet, there is limited knowledge of public attitudes regarding retaliation for nuclear strikes against US allies. We develop a theoretical typology of nuclear crises and investigate this phenomenon with a novel survey experiment ( n = 6,623). Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans viewed realistic emergency alert messages about a most-likely case for nuclear retaliation: a North Korean missile attack on a US ally protected by the nuclear umbrella. Support for nuclear retaliation is low in all three countries, with important cross-national differences. Favorability increases with North Korean nuclear first-use, but it remains limited nonetheless. Surprisingly, US “tripwire” troop casualties do not increase Americans’ demands for nuclear retaliation. These findings have important implications for the study of nuclear crises and practice of extended deterrence.

“…Moreover, North Korean propaganda reveals information about North Korean threat perception and signals the intentions of the North Korean regime (Sukin 2020). These messages also appear to taken seriously; in survey experiments, both South Koreans and Americans view North Korean rhetoric about escalation during conflicts as credible (Sukin 2019b).…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean Peninsula

Bernhardt

Sukin

2020

Self Cite

A number of proposals for reducing tensions with North Korea have discussed alterations to the program of joint military exercises (JMEs) that South Korea holds. North Korea has also repeatedly called for a reduction or secession of JMEs. Would limiting or halting JMEs be a useful concession for securing a reduction of tensions on the peninsula? We argue that JMEs do not deter North Korea but, instead, provoke provocative rhetoric and actions, demonstrating that North Korea views JMEs as a serious threat to its security. In this paper, we establish a relationship between JMEs and North Korea’s actions. In response to a JME, North Korea can issue warnings or threats as well as take costly signals such as conducting missile or nuclear tests. Using new data on JMEs and North Korean behavior, we find that North Korea systematically responds with aggression to South Korean JMEs. Moreover, we find that the intensity of North Korea’s responses to JMEs is driven by the severity of the threat particular exercises pose, indicating that North Korea responds to JMEs as serious security threats.