Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection Between Incentive Contracts

Teyssier, Sabrina

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1331829

Cited by 16 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 39 publications

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“…Cadsby et al, 2007;Eriksson and Villeval, 2008;Teyssier, 2008;Bartling et al, 2009;Dohmen and Falk, 2011;Fehrenbacher and Pedell, 2012;Larkin and Leider, 2012;Macpherson et al, 2014). Dohmen and Falk (2011), for instance, introduce a sequential design in which they elicit productivity levels for a real effort task at first and, then, give participants the choice between a fixed and a variable scheme.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sorting into Physician Payment Schemes A Laboratory Experiment

2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily refl ect those of the editors. Terms of use: Documents in Ruhr Economic Papers #529Jeannette Brosig-Koch, Nadja Kairies-Schwarz, and Johanna Kokot

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sorting into Physician Payment Schemes A Laboratory Experiment

2014

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Sorting into payment schemes and medical treatment: A laboratory experiment

2017

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In this study, we introduce the opportunity for physicians to sort into capitation or fee-for-service payment. Using a controlled medically framed laboratory experiment with a sequential within-subject design allows isolating sorting from incentive effects. We observe a strong preference for fee-for-service payment, which does not depend on subjects' prior experience with one of the two payment schemes. Further, we identify a significant sorting effect.Subjects choosing capitation deviate ex ante less from patient-optimal medical treatment than subjects who sort into fee-for-service payment. Particularly the latter become even less patient-oriented after introducing the choice option. Consequently, the opportunity to choose between fee-for-service and capitation payment worsens patient treatment, if at all. Our results hold for medical and for nonmedical students.

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Payment mechanism and GP self-selection: capitation versus fee for service

Allard

Jelovac

Léger

2014

Int J Health Care Finance Econ

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This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing gatekeeping general practitioners (GPs) to select their payment mechanism. We model GPs' behavior under the most common payment schemes (capitation and fee for service) and when GPs can select one among them. Our analysis considers GP heterogeneity in terms of both ability and concern for their patients' health. We show that when the costs of wasteful referrals to costly specialized care are relatively high, fee for service payments are optimal to maximize the expected patients' health net of treatment costs. Conversely, when the losses associated with failed referrals of severely ill patients are relatively high, we show that either GPs' self-selection of a payment form or capitation is optimal. Last, we extend our analysis to endogenous effort and to competition among GPs. In both cases, we show that self-selection is never optimal.

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Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection Between Incentive Contracts

Cited by 16 publications

References 39 publications

Sorting into Physician Payment Schemes A Laboratory Experiment

Sorting into Physician Payment Schemes A Laboratory Experiment

Sorting into payment schemes and medical treatment: A laboratory experiment

Payment mechanism and GP self-selection: capitation versus fee for service

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