Experimental evidence on payments for forest commons conservation

Andersson, Krister; Cook, Nathan J.; Grillos, Tara; López, María Claudia; Salk, Carl; Wright, Glenn; Mwangi, Esther

doi:10.1038/s41893-018-0034-z

Cited by 85 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…In this section, the design of the real-effort task (3.1.1), its different payment 210 treatments (3.1.2), and the experimental procedure in the field (3.1.3) are explained. where their payoffs are exclusively non-environmental (e.g., Andersson et al, 2018;219 Handberg and Angelsen, 2019;Narloch et al, 2012). Real-effort tasks can add validity 220 to experimental research concerned with behavior in a particular applied context 221 (Charness et al, 2018), and they have recently become popular in conservation 222 research with natural resource users in the field (Jindal et al, 2017;Nelson et al, 223 2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Effectiveness and equity of Payments for Ecosystem Services: Real-effort experiments with Vietnamese land users

Loft

Gehrig²,

et al. 2018

Preprint

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Abstract:Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are widespread in conservation policy. In PES, environmental effectiveness and social equity are often perceived as conflicting goals. Empirical studies on the relationship between popular design features, such as payment differentiation and payment conditionality, and effectiveness and equity are scarce. Further, they struggle with measuring and separating ecological and equity outcomes. In this study, we combine two incentivized lab-in-the-field experiments with 259 land users from eight villages in North-Western Vietnam to assess both individual conservation effort and community-level equity perceptions under four different PES designs. Effort is measured in a real-effort task with real-world environmental benefits; equity perceptions about payment designs in the real-effort task are measured in a coordination game. We demonstrate that payment design affects both effort and equity perceptions. Payments which are differentiated and are solely conditional on individuals' contributions of effort are perceived as most equitable. They are also more effective in motivating conservation effort than other designs, although the differences are small and not significant for all comparisons. By working out the positive correlation of effectiveness and equity across the four payment schemes, we show that these objectives are not necessarily conflicting goals in incentive-based conservation policy. Further, we can show that women exert greater conservation efforts. We discuss how greater equity and effectiveness could be achieved with reforms towards more input-based distribution criteria in Vietnam's PES legislation and the limitations and opportunities of the experimental paradigm for research on PES.

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Effectiveness and equity of Payments for Ecosystem Services: Real-effort experiments with Vietnamese land users

Loft

Gehrig²,

et al. 2018

Preprint

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show abstract

“…One way in which researchers can help stimulate institutional innovations and to explore their possible behavioral effects is by designing framed behavioral experiments that mimic actual intervention ideas. The results from such experiments can inform policy makers about the likely responses of such intervention ideas, and help avoid creating unintentional consequences of policy interventions [70,88,113]. Finally, one of the policy implications of our work is that government actors at regional and national levels, who are contemplating interventions to improve local critical infrastructure, can use our study to design their own diagnostic analysis of the existing local institutional factors that may help or hinder specific interventions.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Motivates Local Governments to Invest in Critical Infrastructure? Lessons from Chile

Valdivieso

Andersson

2018

Sustainability

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In this study, we identify institutional factors and processes that foster local government decisions about disaster risk reduction, especially critical infrastructure investments and maintenance. We propose that municipal institutional capacities, organization, leadership, and multilevel governance will affect critical infrastructure investments by local governments. To examine these ideas, we employ qualitative analysis to compare two representative medium–sized cities in Chile. Our results suggest that there are two main institutional factors that constitute the foundation for improvements in critical infrastructure in Chile: municipal institutional context and the local administration’s links with decision makers at higher levels of governance. These results imply that future interventions to strengthen local government efforts for disaster risk reduction in terms of critical infrastructures would benefit from a pre-intervention diagnosis of the target location’s existing institutional context and linkages with external governance actors.

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“…Economic experiments are being increasingly applied as they are useful tools to single out specific aspects of PES (e.g., Andersson et al., ). Nevertheless, when looking at the positives of group conditionality (peer effects), we should not forget the negatives (free‐riding incentives in groups).…”

Section: Individual Vs Group Payment Characteristics (Grey Shaded Cementioning

confidence: 99%

On the definition and comparability of individual and group incentives for environmental conservation

Vollan

Hönow

Vorlaufer

2018

CONSERVATION LETTERS

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Experimental evidence on payments for forest commons conservation

Cited by 85 publications

References 47 publications

Effectiveness and equity of Payments for Ecosystem Services: Real-effort experiments with Vietnamese land users

Effectiveness and equity of Payments for Ecosystem Services: Real-effort experiments with Vietnamese land users

What Motivates Local Governments to Invest in Critical Infrastructure? Lessons from Chile

On the definition and comparability of individual and group incentives for environmental conservation

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