Experimental Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

Liu, Yang; Chen, Teng-Yun; Wang, Liujun; Liang, H.; Shentu, Guo-Liang; Wang, Jian; Cui, Ke; Yin, Hua-Lei; Liu, Nai-Le; Li, Li; Ma, Xiongfeng; Pelc, Jason S.; Fejer, M. M.; Peng, Cheng-Zhi; Zhang, Qiang; Pan, Jian-Wei

doi:10.1103/physrevlett.111.130502

Cited by 402 publications

(195 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Short of full device independence, we can also entertain intermediate scenarios, where some parts of the devices are trusted and some are not. Indeed, proposals that address issues such as untrusted detectors 63,64 offer significant improvements over the existing quantum key distribution schemes 65,66 and move secure communication in interesting new directions.…”

Section: Practicalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ultimate physical limits of privacy

Ekert

Renner

2014

Nature

128

104

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Among those who make a living from the science of secrecy, worry and paranoia are just signs of professionalism. Can we protect our secrets against those who wield superior technological powers? Can we trust those who provide us with tools for protection? Can we even trust ourselves, our own freedom of choice? Recent developments in quantum cryptography show that some of these questions can be addressed and discussed in precise and operational terms, suggesting that privacy is indeed possible under surprisingly weak assumptions.Edgar Allan Poe, an American writer and an amateur cryptographer, once wrote "… it may be roundly asserted that human ingenuity cannot concoct a cipher which human ingenuity cannot resolve …" 1 . Is it true? Are we doomed to be deprived of our privacy, no matter how hard we try to retain it? If the history of secret communication is of any guidance here, the answer is a resounding 'yes'. There is hardly a shortage of examples illustrating how the most brilliant efforts of code-makers were matched by the ingenuity of code-breakers 2 . Even today, the best that modern cryptography can offer are security reductions, telling us, for example, that breaking RSA, one of the most widely used public key cryptographic systems, is at least as hard as factoring large integers 3 . But is factoring really hard? Not with quantum technology. Indeed, RSA, and many other public key cryptosystems, will become insecure once a quantum computer is built 4 . Admittedly, that day is probably decades away, but can anyone prove, or give any reliable assurance, that it is? Confidence in the slowness of technological progress is all that the security of our best ciphers now rests on.This said, the requirements for perfectly secure communication are well understood. When technical buzzwords are stripped away, all we need to construct a perfect cipher is shared private randomness, more precisely, a sequence of random bits known as a 'cryptographic key'. Any two parties who share the key, we call them Alice and Bob (not their real names, of course), can then use it to communicate secretly, using a simple encryption method known as the one-time pad 5 . The key is turned into a meaningful message by one party telling the other, in public, which bits of the key should be flipped. An eavesdropper, Eve, who has monitored the public communication and knows the general method of encryption but not the key will not be able to infer anything useful about the message. It is vital though that the key bits be truly random, never reused, and securely delivered to Alice and Bob, who may be miles apart. This is not easy, but it can be done, and one can only be amazed how well quantum physics lends itself to the task of key distribution.Quantum key distribution, proposed independently by Bennett and Brassard 6 and by Ekert 7 , derives its security either from the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (certain pairs of physical properties are complementary in the sense that knowing one property necessarily precludes knowledge about the othe...

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Section: Practicalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ultimate physical limits of privacy

Ekert

Renner

2014

Nature

128

104

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“…This scheme is known as measurement-device-independent QKD (mdiQKD) 23 and offers a clear avenue to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Its feasibility has been promptly demonstrated both in laboratories and via field tests [24][25][26][27] . It successfully removes all (existing and yet to be discovered) detector side channels 3,5,6,[9][10][11] , which, arguably, is the most critical part of most QKD implementations.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Finite-key analysis for measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution

et al. 2014

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Quantum key distribution promises unconditionally secure communications. However, as practical devices tend to deviate from their specifications, the security of some practical systems is no longer valid. In particular, an adversary can exploit imperfect detectors to learn a large part of the secret key, even though the security proof claims otherwise. Recently, a practical approach-measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution-has been proposed to solve this problem. However, so far its security has only been fully proven under the assumption that the legitimate users of the system have unlimited resources. Here we fill this gap and provide a rigorous security proof against general attacks in the finite-key regime. This is obtained by applying large deviation theory, specifically the Chernoff bound, to perform parameter estimation. For the first time we demonstrate the feasibility of long-distance implementations of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission.

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“…The MDIQKD protocol has been demonstrated over 200 km [26,27,28,29] and in field test [30]. While the MDIQKD protocol enjoys the advantage of being secure against any detection loopholes, the RRDPS protocol is able to tolerate higher error rate.…”

Section: Db/kmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical round-robin differential phase-shift quantum key distribution

et al. 2016

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Abstract. The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) relies on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, with which legitimate users are able to estimate information leakage by monitoring the disturbance of the transmitted quantum signals. Normally, the disturbance is reflected as bit flip errors in the sifted key; thus, privacy amplification, which removes any leaked information from the key, generally depends on the bit error rate. Recently, a round-robin differential-phase-shift QKD protocol for which privacy amplification does not rely on the bit error rate [Nature 509, 475 (2014)] was proposed. The amount of leaked information can be bounded by the sender during the state-preparation stage and hence, is independent of the behaviour of the unreliable quantum channel. In our work, we apply the tagging technique to the protocol and present a tight bound on the key rate and employ a decoy-state method. The effects of background noise and misalignment are taken into account under practical conditions. Our simulation results show that the protocol can tolerate channel error rates close to 50% within a typical experiment setting. That is, there is a negligible restriction on the error rate in practice.Practical round-robin differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution 2

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Experimental Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

Cited by 402 publications

References 36 publications

The ultimate physical limits of privacy

The ultimate physical limits of privacy

Finite-key analysis for measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution

Practical round-robin differential phase-shift quantum key distribution

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