Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition

Stich, Stephen; Tobia, Kevin

doi:10.1002/9781118661666.ch1

Cited by 59 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…Two distinctive strands, however, seek to engage directly with work in the mainstream of analytic philosophy: They study intuitions prompted by verbal descriptions of hypothetical cases which philosophers consider in thought experiments and arguments. The ‘Concept Project’ (review: Alexander, , pp.28–49) studies such ‘case intuitions’ for the purposes of conceptual analysis; the ‘Warrant Project’ (review: Stich & Tobia, ) does so to assess their evidentiary value and philosophers’ warrant for accepting them.…”

Section: Philosophical Relevancementioning

confidence: 99%

Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit

Fischer

Engelhardt

2017

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Stereotypes shape inferences in philosophical thought, political discourse, and everyday life. These inferences are routinely made when thinkers engage in language comprehension or production:We make them whenever we hear, read, or formulate stories, reports, philosophical case-descriptions, or premises of argumentson virtually any topic. These inferences are largely automatic: largely unconscious, non-intentional, and effortless. Accordingly, they shape our thought in ways we can properly understand only by complementing traditional forms of philosophical analysis with experimental methods from psycholinguistics. This paper seeks, first, to bring out the wider philosophical relevance of stereotypical inference, well beyond familiar topics like gender and race. Second, we wish to provide (experimental) philosophers with a toolkit to experimentally study these ubiquitous inferences and what intuitions they may generate. This paper explains what stereotypes are (Section 1), and why they matter to current and traditional concerns in philosophy -experimental, analytic, and applied (Section 2). It then assembles a psycholinguistic toolkit and demonstrates through two studies (Sections 3-4) how potentially questionnairebased measures (plausibility-ratings) can be combined with process measures (reaction times and pupillometry) to garner evidence for specific stereotypical inferences and study when they 'go through' and influence our thinking.

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Section: Philosophical Relevancementioning

confidence: 99%

Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit

Fischer

Engelhardt

2017

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“…Some experimental philosophy research may be classified as "negative" because so many of the results support "negative"-style inferences. For instance, studies on the reliability of philosophers' intuitions suggest against expertise in philosophical intuition (Shulz, Cokely, and Feltz 2011;Machery 2012;Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012;Tobia, Buckwalter, and Stich 2013;Tobia, Chapman, and Stich 2013;Knobe and Samuels 2013;Vaesen, Peterson, and Van Bezooijen 2013;Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2015;Tobia forthcoming). This negative characterization is not part of the pre-empirical theory but is rather an interpretation of the empirical findings; "negative" conclusions about the reliability of expert intuition are drawn on the basis of empirical results.…”

Section: Philosophical Methods and Experimental Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…My focus is exclusively on the branches of experimental philosophy that deal with the systematic investigation of intuition use through psychological (typically survey) methodology. While other types of activities arguably fall under the category of experimental philosophy, much of the most recent work has been concerned with investigating intuition (Knobe and Nichols ; Stich and Tobia forthcoming). One distinction worth mentioning is between what are often called the positive and negative projects of experimental philosophy.…”

Section: Philosophical Methods and Experimental Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions

Tobia

2015

Metaphilosophy

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Many philosophers claim to employ intuitions in their philosophical arguments. Others contest that no such intuitions are used frequently or at all in philosophy. This article suggests and defends a conception of intuitions as part of the philosophical method: intuitions are special types of philosophical assumptions to which we are invited to assent, often as premises in argument, that may serve an independent function in philosophical argument and that are not formed through a purely inferential process. A series of philosophical case studies shows that intuitions in these arguments contain the relevant features. The view has implications for philosophical method, offering a compromise between opponents on the divisive debate of the merits of experimental philosophy: experimental philosophy provides an especially useful role in philosophical assumption analysis.

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“…An important strand of experimental philosophy examines whether and when philosophically relevant intuitions have evidentiary value—and whether and when philosophers possess warrant for accepting them (for reviews, see Mallon, ; Stich & Tobia, ). The most ambitious research program within this remit (initiated by Nichols & Knobe, ), known as the “Sources Project” (Pust, ) or “cognitive epistemology” (Fischer, ), develops and experimentally tests psychological explanations of intuitions that help us assess their evidentiary value.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lingering stereotypes: Salience bias in philosophical argument

Fischer

Engelhardt

2019

Mind & Language

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Many philosophical thought experiments and arguments involve unusual cases. We present empirical reasons to doubt the reliability of intuitive judgments and conclusions about such cases. Inferences and intuitions prompted by verbal case descriptions are influenced by routine comprehension processes which invoke stereotypes. We build on psycholinguistic findings to determine conditions under which the stereotype associated with the most salient sense of a word predictably supports inappropriate inferences from descriptions of unusual (stereotype-divergent) cases. We conduct an experiment that combines plausibility ratings with pupillometry to document this 'salience bias': We find that under certain conditions, competent speakers automatically make stereotypical inferences they know to be inappropriate.

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Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition

Cited by 59 publications

References 70 publications

Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit

Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit

Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions

Lingering stereotypes: Salience bias in philosophical argument

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