Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference

Deutsch, Max

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01370.x

Cited by 102 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Several objections have been raised against MMNS's work and subsequently been answered in the literature (for criticisms, see Ludwig 2007, Deutsch 2009, Martí 2009, Cullen 2010, Lam 2010, Ichikawa et al 2012, Devitt 2011, Devitt 2012a, and Devitt 2012b; for replies, 1 One might worry that although the difference is statistically significant, it is not very large. Indeed, according to Cohen's h, the effect size is given by h = arcsin(0.565) -arcsin(0.315) = 0.280, which would ordinarily be classified as a small effect.…”

Section: The Gödel Case and The Uniformity Conjecturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, we have reason to doubt that differences in the age compositions of the two samples accounts for the differences in responses. 8 It is worth noting that our study did not specifically control for a third potential confound that has been pressed in the literature-that MMNS's original Gödel probe question is ambiguous with regard to asking about the speaker's reference or semantic reference of John's use of the name "Gödel" (Ludwig 2007, Deutsch 2009). Nonetheless, while this ambiguity is distinct from the perspectival ambiguity, it is plausible that the two narrator's perspective probes clarify it as well, as discussed by Sytsma and Livengood (2011).…”

Section: New Evidence Against the Uniformity Conjecturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names

et al. 2014

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A standard methodology in philosophy of language is to use intuitions as evidence. Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich (2004) challenged this methodology with respect to theories of reference by presenting empirical evidence that intuitions about one prominent example from the literature on the reference of proper names (Kripke's Gödel case) vary between Westerners and East Asians. In response, Sytsma and Livengood (2011) conducted experiments to show that the questions Machery and colleagues asked participants in their study were ambiguous, and that this ambiguity affected the responses given by Westerners. Sytsma and Livengood took their results to cast doubt on the claim that the current evidence indicates that there is cross-cultural variation in intuitions about the Gödel case. In this paper we report on a new cross-cultural study showing that variation in intuitions remains even after controlling for the ambiguity noted by Sytsma and Livengood.In a widely discussed article, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich (2004, MMNS) argued that the common practice of appealing to one's own intuitions about cases as evidence for or against philosophical theories of reference is suspect. Specifically, MMNS targeted a standard justification for this practice. They noted that philosophers of language often assume that the relevant semantic intuitions are widely held and do not systematically differ across theoretically salient groups, taking such widespread agreement to indicate that the intuitions are reliable. Following Sytsma and Livengood (2011), we will refer to this assumption as the uniformity conjecture. MMNS presented empirical evidence suggesting that the uniformity conjecture is false: Intuitions about the semantic reference of a proper name in one prominent case from the literature (Kripke's Gödel case) differ in a statistically significant way between Western and East Asian cultures.

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Section: The Gödel Case and The Uniformity Conjecturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: New Evidence Against the Uniformity Conjecturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names

et al. 2014

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“…Varias objeciones ya formuladas en la literatura inciden en el hecho de que las encuestas elaboradas por Machery et al resultaban ambiguas, y no permitían una interpretación clara de las respuestas obtenidas (cf. Ludwig 2007;Deutsch 2009). Precisamente, una motivación de las nuevas encuestas descritas en Machery et al (2015) era minimizar ese problema.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

“…También evaluaré muy brevemente algunos aspectos de otras críticas que se han realizado (cf. Martí 2009;Deutsch 2009), lo cual nos conducirá a reflexionar sobre el papel de las intuiciones en la justificación de las teorías filosóficas (secs. 6, 7 y 8).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Teorías de la referencia, filosofía experimental y calibración de intuiciones

Otero

2017

THEORIA

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RESUMEN: E. Machery y algunos colaboradores suyos han utilizado datos sobre encuestas para criticar el anti-descriptivismo sobre los nombres propios de Kripke. Presento aquí diversos inconvenientes de esas encuestas. Algunas de mis objeciones conciernen a su ambigüedad. En particular, las respuestas que -según Machery et al.-revelan intuiciones descriptivistas pueden interpretarse como respuestas anti-descriptivistas, por razones que -por lo que yo sé-nadie ha destacado hasta ahora. Además, los casos presentados a los encuestados son aparentemente inconsistentes. También abordo otras cuestiones relacionadas con el papel de las intuiciones en la filosofía; las tesis de Machery et al. dependen de un supuesto injustificado: no existen capacidades expertas respecto a las intuiciones.Palabras clave: Kripke; Machery; descriptivismo; capacidades expertas; nombres propios; semántica inter-cultural; experimentos mentales; justificación empírica.ABSTRACT: E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke's anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that -according to them-reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses, for reasons that -as far as I know-have not been pointed out so far. Furthermore, their vignettes are apparently inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.'s theses depend on an unjustified assumption: there is not expertise regarding intuitions.

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“…One could provide a purely theoretical critique that points out possible confounds in their study. A number of authors have raised objections of this type [Ludwig 2007;Marti 2009;Deutsch 2009]. Instead of following this wellworn path, we offer an empirical critique of Machery et al's study.…”

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confidence: 99%

A new perspective concerning experiments on semantic intuitions

Sytsma¹,

Livengood²

2009

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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Abstract:In two fascinating articles, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich [2004, forthcoming] use experimental methods to raise a specter of doubt about reliance on intuitions in developing theories of reference which are then deployed in philosophical arguments outside the philosophy of language. Machery et al. ran a cross-cultural survey asking Western and East Asian participants about a famous case from the philosophical literature on reference (Kripke's Gödel example). They interpret their results as indicating that there is significant variation in participants' intuitions about semantic reference for that case. We argue that this interpretation is mistaken. We detail a type of ambiguity found in Machery et al.'s probe but not yet noted in the response literature. We argue that this epistemic ambiguity could have affected their results. We do not stop there, however: Rather than rest content with a possibility claim, we ran four studies to test the impact of this ambiguity on participants' responses. We found that this accounts for much of the variation in Machery et al.'s original experiment. We conclude that in the light of our new data, their argument is no longer convincing. Keywords:Reference; Semantic Intuitions; Experimental Philosophy; Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich; Kripke; Gödel In two provocative articles, Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich [2004, forthcoming] have argued that there is a problem with the standard methodology for work on reference in modern analytic philosophy. They argue that this methodology attempts to construct theories consistent with our intuitions about prominent fictional and non-fictional cases [2004: B3]. Philosophical method presupposes that intuitions for such cases are sufficiently uniform across the relevant populations of people.2 Call this presupposition the uniformity conjecture. The uniformity conjecture is a testable, empirical claim (once sufficiently specified).However, philosophers have offered no empirical evidence that the conjecture is true.

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Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference

Cited by 102 publications

References 19 publications

Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names

Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names

Teorías de la referencia, filosofía experimental y calibración de intuiciones

A new perspective concerning experiments on semantic intuitions

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