Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms

Ledyard, John O.; Porter, David; Rangel, António O. S. S.

doi:10.1017/9781316471609.026

Cited by 15 publications

(28 citation statements)

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“…However, this auction format does not allow package bidding. Ledyard et al (1997) demonstrate that the performance of the FCC design degrades in the presence of complementarities. More generally, when bidder valuations for multiple objects are super-additive, package bidding is necessary to increase efficiency, seller revenue and bidder willingness to participate (Bykowsky et al, 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA

Chen

Takeuchi

2010

Games and Economic Behavior

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA

Chen

Takeuchi

2010

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…Cybernomics (2000), Plott (1997), Ledyard, Porter, and Rangel (1997)). Because the package bidding mechanisms being considered are all novel, there isn't a source of field data that would be informative for design.…”

Section: Comparison Of the Applicant And Program Proposing Algorithmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

Roth¹

2002

Econometrica

801

405

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Economists have lately been called upon not only to analyze markets, but to design them. Market design involves a responsibility for detail, a need to deal with all of a market's complications, not just its principle features. Designers therefore cannot work only with the simple conceptual models used for theoretical insights into the general working of markets. Instead, market design calls for an engineering approach. Drawing primarily on the design of the entry level labor market for American doctors (the National Resident Matching Program), and of the auctions of radio spectrum conducted by the Federal Communications Commission, this paper makes the case that experimental and computational economics are natural complements to game theory in the work of design. The paper also argues that some of the challenges facing both markets involve dealing with related kinds of complementarities, and that this suggests an agenda for future theoretical research.

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“…Rafael Tenorio (1993) and Steven R. Umlauf (1993) perform similar revenue comparisons with field data on Zambian currency auctions and Mexican Treasury bill auctions, respectively. Some recent laboratory experiments have explored auction environments with subjects selling multiple units of dissimilar goods (List and Shogren, 1998b) and buying multiple units of dissimilar, complementary goods (David Brenner and John Morgan, 1997;John O. Ledyard et al, 1997;Charles R. Plott, 1997;Mark Isaac and Duncan James, 1999).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment

List

Lucking-Reiley

2000

American Economic Review

170

121

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Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA

Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA

The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment

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