Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms

Ledyard, John O.; Porter, David; Rangel, António O. S. S.

doi:10.1162/105864097567228

Cited by 103 publications

(39 citation statements)

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“…In an early study, Ledyard et al (1997) compared SMRA with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction within various value models. They found that combinatorial auction are best suited in environments with value complementarities.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The design of such auctions, however, led to a number of fundamental problems, and many theoretical and experimental contributions during the past ten years (Cramton et al, 2006b). The existing experimental literature comparing SMRAs and CAs suggests that in the presence of significant complementarities in bidders' valuations and a setting with independent private and quasi-linear valuations, combinatorial auctions achieve higher efficiency than simultaneous auctions (Banks et al, 1989;Ledyard et al, 1997;Porter et al, 2003;Kwasnica et al, 2005;Brunner et al, 2010;Goeree and Holt, 2010). Since 2008 several countries such as the U.K., Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, and the U.S. have adopted combinatorial auctions for selling spectrum rights (Cramton, 2009b).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs

2013

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For many years the Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) has been the primary auction design for spectrum sales worldwide. Recently, the core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) has been used as an alternative to the SMRA in a number of countries promising strong incentives for truthful bidding and high efficiency as a result. We analyze the efficiency and auctioneer revenue of the CCA in comparison to SMRA and examine bidding behavior in both formats. The experiments are based on two value models, which resemble single-and multiband spectrum sales in the field. Such applications often allow for thousands of possible bundles. Bidders in the CCA submitted bids for only a fraction of all bundles with a positive valuation. Bundles were selected based on synergies and payoff after the primary bid rounds. As a consequence, we found efficiency of the CCA to be significantly lower than that of SMRA in the multi-band value model and auctioneer revenue of the CCA to be lower in both value models. In addition, we characterize several properties of the auction format, which result from the two-stage design and the payment and activity rules.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs

2013

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“…The two most important of these are the incentives it provides for inefficient withholding of demand in the case goods are substitutes and its degraded performance in laboratory experiments in which the substitutes condition fails (Ledyard, Porter and Rangel (1997)), a condition that may have applied to the radio spectrum auctions (Ausubel, Cramton, McAfee and McMillan (1997)). To explain the role of the substitutes condition in theoretical terms, we compare two different situations.…”

Section: Simultaneous Ascending Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding

Ausubel

Milgrom

2002

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

231

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Abstract. A benchmark "package auction" is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. If all bidders bid straightforwardly, then the outcome is a point in the core of the exchange economy that minimizes the seller's revenue. When goods are substitutes, straightforward bidding strategies comprise an ex post Nash equilibrium. Compared to the Vickrey auction, the benchmark ascending package auction has cheaper information processing, better handling of budget constraints, and less vulnerability to joint bidding strategies among bidders who would otherwise be losers. Improvements are suggested that speed the auction and limit opportunities for collusion.

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“…The Federal Communications Commission auctions of wireless communication licenses were different because of complementarities between the different licenses. These economic environments have been described as combined value auctions and were experimentally investigated in the context of airline slot allocation [129], payloads for NASA's Space Station [13], tracking routes [126], pollution license trading, and spectrum auctions [96,123,125]. Further applications are discussed in [164].…”

Section: Introduction and Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Combinatorial Market Processing for Multilateral Coordination

Jain¹,

Varalye²

2005

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Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms

Cited by 103 publications

References 0 publications

Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs

Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs

Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding

Combinatorial Market Processing for Multilateral Coordination

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