Explaining Australia–Japan security cooperation and its prospects: ‘the interests that bind?’

Abstract

In this paper, we assess the drivers of, and prospects for, further security cooperation in the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship. We argue that while balance of threat and capability gaps may restrain the pace of deepening Australian-Japan security relations, these gaps are diminishing and are, in any case, secondary to the specific shared interests we posit as the primary drivers of Australia-Japan security cooperation. These specific interests, however, are shaped not only by a commitment in both countries to liberal-based principles and freedoms at home and in inter-state relations, but also by a common awareness of the importance of continued US primacy to the ongoing maintenance of those interests. Thus, in the absence of any fundamental change in how Australia and Japan understand their respective interests and the US role in the region, Donald Trump's recent and unexpected election as US president notwithstanding, we conclude that the case for further security cooperation -via additional cross-bracing of their respective US alliance relationships -will almost certainly remain compelling for both countries.

‘Steady as She Goes’: Effect of the Fukushima Disaster on Australia-Japan Relations

“…It was reasonable to expect that if Abe's new administration adopted a similar approach to regional security and bilateral relationship with Australia, this would not only further strengthen the bilateral strategic security cooperation, as it did in 2014, but also lead to the final conclusion of bilateral FTA negotiations. According to Heazle and Tatsumi (2018), the case for further security cooperation will remain compelling for both countries.…”