Explaining Differences in Scientific Expertise Use: The Politics of Pesticides

Abstract

Despite the growing importance of EU regulatory agencies in European decision-making, academic literature is missing a systematic explanation of how regulatory agencies actually contend with their core tasks of providing scientific advice to EU institutions. The article contributes to the theoretical explanation of when and under what conditions different uses of scientific expertise prevail. In particular, it focuses on theoretical explanations leading to strategic substantiating use of expertise followed by an empirical analysis of single case research. Substantiating expertise use refers to those practices in which an organisation seeks to promote and justify its predetermined preferences, which are based on certain values, political or economic interests. Empirical findings are discussed in the light of the theoretical expectations derived by streamlining and combining the main arguments of classical organisational and institutional theories and recent academic research. Process-tracing techniques are applied to investigate the process by which an EU regulation restricting the use of neonicotinoid pesticides (European Commission, 2013) was developed. The empirical analysis combines a variety of data sources including official documents, press releases, scientific outputs, and semi-structured interviews with the academic and industry experts involved in the process. The study finds that the interaction between high external pressure and high internal capacity leads to the strategic substantiating use of expertise, in which scientific evidence is used to promote the inclinations of actors upon which the agency depends most.

Meeting expectations in the EU regulatory state? Regulatory communications amid conflicting institutional demands

“…For all the discourse on de-politicisation, their areas of operation are often heavily politicised. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) assessments on GMOs and pesticides (most recently glyphosate), for instance, have been the subject of heavy public controversy (Groenleer 2009;Rimkutė 2015Rimkutė , 2018b).…”

Organizational reputation and risk regulation: The effect of reputational threats on agency scientific outputs

“…However, the regulation of risks and hazards is highly polarized. Scholars observe that regulatory agencies' scientific practices—that is, the ways in which scientific knowledge is used in risk assessments—vary considerably (Jasanoff ; Rothstein et al ; Rimkutė , ). The debates between independent regulators become even more heated when it comes to environmental, chemical or foodstuff policy‐making (Lodge and Wegrich ; Lofstedt and Schlag ).…”

“…Given the increasing relevance of regulatory agencies in risk governance, this study proposes an explanation of how risk regulators cope with their key duties of delivering scientific advice to political organizations. Scholars in the field have observed that scientific knowledge and technical expertise can have many functions in regulatory politics (Schrefler ; Rimkutė ). However, endeavours to examine the ways in which scientific knowledge is used in risk assessments, as well as how technical expertise is advanced by regulatory agencies, have been scarce due to the limitations (1) in the conceptualization of diverse strategies to utilize scientific knowledge, and (2) the theorization of explanatory factors that account for variance in scientific risk assessments (Schrefler ; Rimkutė ).…”

Information, values and expert decision-making: the case of soil decontamination

“…The justification for such trust in experts rests on assumptions about their specialized knowledge and skills, which are commonly thought to produce more rational, well-founded decisions. Numerous studies have challenged these assumptions, however, with evidence suggesting that values also play a role in expert decision-making (Sabatier and Zafonte 2001;Barke and Jenkins-Smith 1993;Jenkins-Smith et al 2009;Rimkut_ e 2015;Haas 2004;Gottweis 1998). Despite this well-documented observation, calls for more deference toward experts continue, justified by the idea that policy decisions should be protected against the biases of activists, politicians and a relatively un-informed public (Weber and Stern 2011;Henderson 2012;Paarlberg 2008;Blinder 1997;Margolis 1996).…”