1978
DOI: 10.2307/2025425
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Explaining Emotions

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Cited by 74 publications
(48 citation statements)
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“…The problem with the view that emotions involve an evaluative judgment is that one would have to attribute contradictory judgments to the person who experiences the emotion. For instance, we would have to say that she judges that the object of our fear is fearsome, while also judging that it is not (see Rorty 1978, Greenspan 1988, Deigh 1994, D'Arms and Jacobson…”
Section: Theoretical Considerationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The problem with the view that emotions involve an evaluative judgment is that one would have to attribute contradictory judgments to the person who experiences the emotion. For instance, we would have to say that she judges that the object of our fear is fearsome, while also judging that it is not (see Rorty 1978, Greenspan 1988, Deigh 1994, D'Arms and Jacobson…”
Section: Theoretical Considerationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Landman (1993) suggests that responsibility may distinguish different states of regret but is not a defining feature of it, a view reflected in many philosophical attempts to draw distinctions between simple regret, agent-regret, guilt, and remorse (Baron, 1988;Rorty, 1980;Thalberg, 1963;Williams, 1976). A rather extreme (and potentially regrettable) position is taken by Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007), who consider responsibility to be a precondition of regret and have declared this unambiguously: "No choice, no regret" (p. 15).…”
Section: Regret and Responsibilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Where cultural variation might be expected to play a larger role is in the stimulus or cause of an emotion, which is evaluated cognitively. Over the past thirty years or so, investigators in several disciplines have increasingly recognized that emotions typically involve a substantial cognitive and evaluative component (see Averill 1980;Frank, 1988;Harré, 1986;Oatley, 1992;Rorty, 1980;Solomon, 1993;on appraisal, Forgas, 2000;Frijda, 1993;Frijda, Manstead, & Bem, 2000;Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). The traditional opposition between reason and emotion is no longer the reigning paradigm in science or philosophy.…”
Section: Theoretical Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%