Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style

Silva, Paul

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0987-1

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 32 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Nothing will turn on this issue in what follows. 8 For similar observations see Foley (1991) and Silva (2018).…”

Section: A Path To Knowledge-first Evidentialismmentioning

confidence: 65%

“…But this strikes us as implausible in the present case and others as well. For defense of the possibility of such evidence seeConee (1987),Richter (1990: 150ff),Kroon (1990), andSilva (2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This leaves open the question of what propositional justification amounts to. For such knowledge-first theorists, FOP is an exceedingly natural stance to take and it is motivated on independent grounds (cf Silva 2018Sylvan 2018;Lord 2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact

Eyal¹,

Silva²

2021

Epistemic Dilemmas

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When a belief is self-fulfilling, having it guarantees its truth. When a belief is self-defeating, having it guarantees its falsity. These are the cases of "self-impacting" beliefs to be examined below. Scenarios of self-defeating beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack sufficient reason to have any belief whatsoever. Scenarios of self-fulfilling beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack reason to have any one belief over another. Both scenarios have been used independently to challenge Evidentialism, on which what we may rationally believe is all and only what fits our current evidence. Here we tie the two scenarios together and explore what a knowledge-sensitive evidentialist approach to one implies for the other.

show abstract

“…Nothing will turn on this issue in what follows. 8 For similar observations see Foley (1991) and Silva (2018).…”

Section: A Path To Knowledge-first Evidentialismmentioning

confidence: 65%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact

Eyal¹,

Silva²

2021

Epistemic Dilemmas

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Akratic (epistemic) modesty

Christensen

2020

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Theories of epistemic rationality that take disagreement (or other higher-order evidence) seriously tend to be "modest" in a certain sense: they say that there are circumstances in which it is rational to doubt their correctness. Modest views have been criticized on the grounds that they undermine themselves-they're self-defeating. The standard Self-Defeat Objections depend on principles forbidding epistemically akratic beliefs; but there are good reasons to doubt these principles-even New Rational Reflection, which was designed to allow for certain special cases that are intuitively akratic. On the other hand, if we construct a Self-Defeat Objection without relying on anti-akratic principles, modest principles turn out not to undermine themselves. In the end, modesty should not be seen as a defect in a theory of rational belief.

show abstract

Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief

Silva

2023

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is one thing to hold that merely statistical evidence is sometimes insufficient for rational belief, as in typical lottery and profiling cases. It is another thing to hold that merely statistical evidence is always insufficient for rational belief. Indeed, there are cases where statistical evidence plainly does justify belief. This project develops a dispositional account of the normativity of statistical evidence, where the dispositions that ground justifying statistical evidence are connected to the goals (= proper function) of objects. There are strong intuitive motivations for doing this. For we can turn almost any case of non-justifying merely statistical evidence into a case of justifying merely statistical evidence by adding information about the dispositions and goals of the objects involved. The resulting view not only helps us understand when and why merely statistical evidence is normatively significant, but it also helps us understand how statistical evidence relates to more standard forms of evidence (perceptual, testimonial). The emerging view also has surprising applications, as it imposes limitations on the epistemic value of fine-tuning arguments for theism as well as undermines a standard class of case-based arguments for moral encroachment.

show abstract

Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style

Cited by 5 publications

References 32 publications

Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact

Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact

Akratic (epistemic) modesty

Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About