Explaining EU Performance in the NPT Review Conferences: Limited Ambitions but Pragmatic Positioning

Abstract

In this article explanation for the EU's negotiation performance in the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon) is offered. First examining how the EU has performed over the period 1995 to 2010, it conducts a systematic review of how EU performance has been shaped by a range of variables including the interests of its Member States, its own institutional capabilities, and the wider conditions of the international system. It argues that the major challenge for EU performance within the NPT has been its own negotiation positioning which, beset by limited ambitions, has confined the EU to always being a supporter of the NPT regime rather than a driver of it. Explanation for this can be seen not merely in the invariable challenge of trying to coordinate highly divergent energy and security Member State interests into a workable common position, the lack of EU competence in this field, but also by the difficult structural conditions within the negotiation environment. Taking these conditions into consideration it is suggested that the EU's limited ambition within the NPT may also be the most pragmatic positioning it can take. Resumen:En este artículo se ofrece una explicación de cómo se comporta la UE en las negociaciones en las Conferencias de Revisión del Tratado de No-Proliferación Nuclear (NPT RevCon). Examinando en primer lugar a la UE a lo largo del periodo de 1995 a 2010, se realiza una revisión sistemática de cómo el comportamiento de la UE se ha conformado a partir de un amplio abanico de variables, entre las cuales se encuentran los intereses de los Estados Miembros, sus propias capacidades institucionales, y condiciones más generales del sistema internacional. Se argumenta que el mayor desafío a que la UE se ha enfrentado en el TNP ha sido su propia postura negociadora, la cual, constreñida por ambiciones limitadas, ha reducido su papel al de mero apoyo del TNP, más que a asumir un rol director. Una explicación de ello puede encontrarse no únicamente en el constante desafío de tener que coordinar los intereses muy divergentes en materia de seguridad y defensa de sus Estados Miembros y plasmarlos en una posición común, sino también en la falta de competencia de la UE en este campo y también por las difíciles condiciones estructurales dentro del ambiente negociador. Tomando en consideración estas condiciones, se sugiere que la ambición limitada de la UE dentro del TNP puede resultar ser la postura más pragmática que pueda tomar.Palabras clave: Unión Europea, Conferencia de Revisión del TNP, coherencia, negociaciones internas, desarme, disuasión nuclear, control de armamento nuclear, CFSP.

Contestation to the European Union on nuclear non-proliferation

“…Contestation to the EU nuclear non-proliferation policy in a multilateral setting, the case of the RevCon For the EU, the RevCons are a challenge (Dee, 2014). In terms of external competencies, the EU can't act on behalf of its Member States in this policy area, nor is the EU itself a member of the NPT.…”

“…France), and several Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), each of which has sovereign nuclear interests, many of which are very divergent, emphasizing the heterogeneity of preferences inside the EU. Therefore, while EU Member States, since the 1995 RevCon, have entered each conference with a common position in force and with a common representation during the negotiations, they also participate in the negotiations in their national capacity (Dee, 2014). In this respect, it does not seem very logical a priori to examine the contestation of the EU in a forum where it has virtually no role to play.…”

“…So, based on this fact, the EU has been unable to accommodate the position of many NNWS regarding nuclear disarmament; instead, the EU position reflects just that it is a strong supporter of the multilateral process and an avid advocate of the NPT, but that it is notable for its ambiguity. The EU's common positions have subsequently been contested by the rest of the parties to the NPT, and particularly NNWS, arguing these were too universal in their policy objectives (Dee, 2014), too low in the common denominator (Müller, 2005) and, due to the interests of its own NWS, somewhat reticent in particular on the issue of nuclear disarmament (Acheson, 2011). This position has serious consequences for the way the EU is seen by third parties in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.…”