2018
DOI: 10.1111/lamp.12149
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Explaining Expulsions of U.S. Diplomatic Personnel from Latin America, 1991–2016

Abstract: This article examines expulsions of U.S. diplomats from Latin America and the Caribbean between 1991 and 2016. Employing an original data set of expulsions of U.S. diplomatic personnel, the analysis focuses on the number of first‐mover expulsions—cases where the Latin American government was the first to expel a U.S. diplomat in a year. The models are estimated with pooled negative binomial regression with robust standard errors. The results suggest there were more first‐mover expulsions in countries governed … Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
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“…These studies highlight the role of diplomats in bilateral relations (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016; Neumann, 2012), as well as the role of differing levels of delegation of IO staff in impacting cooperative outcomes (Hawkins et al., 2006; Parizek, 2017; Vaubel et al., 2007). In these accounts, individual diplomats can have discrete influence on policy outcomes (Gertz, 2018; Jordan and Tuman, 2018; Lindsey, 2017), and professional diplomatic technocrats face different incentives than do political actors (Johnson, 2013; Poulsen and Aisbett, 2016). Such lenses have already been applied to the UN, showing how, for example, changes in the appointment process of the Secretary General have influenced policy outcomes (Wiseman, 2015).…”
Section: Introduction1mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These studies highlight the role of diplomats in bilateral relations (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016; Neumann, 2012), as well as the role of differing levels of delegation of IO staff in impacting cooperative outcomes (Hawkins et al., 2006; Parizek, 2017; Vaubel et al., 2007). In these accounts, individual diplomats can have discrete influence on policy outcomes (Gertz, 2018; Jordan and Tuman, 2018; Lindsey, 2017), and professional diplomatic technocrats face different incentives than do political actors (Johnson, 2013; Poulsen and Aisbett, 2016). Such lenses have already been applied to the UN, showing how, for example, changes in the appointment process of the Secretary General have influenced policy outcomes (Wiseman, 2015).…”
Section: Introduction1mentioning
confidence: 99%