Explaining formation and design of EU trade agreements: The role of transparency and flexibility

Baccini, Leonardo

doi:10.1177/1465116509359431

Cited by 17 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Flexibility strings allow countries to maintain predictability even when engaging in deep cooperation. Finally, we add an analysis of PTAs to the literature on the design of international institutions that so far has mainly focused on a few prominent international organizations (but see Baccini ; Kucik ). Our empirical focus provides an important analytical advantage: In the negotiations on PTAs, all aspects of design are up for discussion.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus

2015

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1Forthcoming in International Studies Quarterly. AbstractExisting research indicates that different dimensions of the design of international institutions are interrelated. In particular, deep agreements have been shown to be more flexible. We make two contributions to this literature. On the one hand, we argue and empirically show that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility holds for preferential trade agreements (PTAs). On the other hand, we add two qualifications to the conventional wisdom about depth and flexibility going hand in hand. First, we argue that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility is weaker for democracies than for non-democracies. Second, when making deep agreements more flexible, countries also add strings to the use of the additional flexibility provisions. An original dataset on the design of 587 PTAs allows us to test our arguments. Both descriptive evidence and multivariate statistics support the theoretical expectations. The findings contribute to the literatures on the design of international institutions and the causes and consequences of PTAs.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus

2015

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“…While this does not prove that the threat of retaliation was the reason why tariffs were abandoned, it does suggest that this may have played a role. The European Commission stands out in terms of transparency regarding the objectives it aims to achieve in the context of trade disputes (see Stasavage, 2004;Baccini, 2010 on the role of transparency). Specifically, EU Regulation 654, published in 2014, outlines three objectives for commercial policy measures in the context of a trade dispute: 'Commercial policy measures .…”

Section: Retaliatory Tariffs As a Political Toolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump’s Trade Wars

Fetzer

Schwarz

2020

The Economic Journal

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We use the recent trade escalation between the USA and its trade partners to study whether retaliatory tariffs are politically targeted. We find comprehensive evidence using individual and aggregate voting data suggesting that retaliation is carefully targeted to hurt Trump. We develop a simulation approach to construct counterfactual retaliation responses allowing us to quantify the extent of political targeting while also studying potential trade-offs. China appears to place great emphasis on achieving maximal political targeting. The EU seems to have been successful in maximising political targeting while at the same time minimising the potential damage to its economy.

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“…While this does not proof that the threat of retaliation was the reason why tariffs were abandoned, it does suggest that it may have played a role. The European Commission stands out in terms of transparently the objectives it aims to achieve in the context of trade disputes (see Baccini, 2010;Stasavage, 2004 on the role of transparency). Specifically, EU Regulation 654, published in 2014, outlines three objectives for commercial policy measures in the context of a trade dispute: (c) availability of alternative sources of supply for the goods or services concerned, in order to avoid or minimise any negative impact on downstream industries, contracting authorities or entities, or final consumers within the Union;…”

Section: Retaliatory Tariffs As a Political Toolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars

Fetzer

Schwarz

2019

SSRN Journal

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We use the recent trade escalation between the US, China, the European Union (EU), Canada and Mexico to study whether retaliatory tariffs are politically targeted. Using aggregate and individual-level data we find evidence that the retaliatory tariffs disproportionally targeted areas that swung to Trump in 2016, but not to other Republican candidates. We propose a novel simulation approach to construct counterfactual retaliation responses. This allows us to both quantify the extent of political targeting and assess the general feasibility. Further, the counterfactual retaliation responses allow us to shed light on the potential trade-offs between achieving a high degree of political targeting and managing the risks to ones own economy. China, while being constrained in its retaliation design, appears to put large weight on achieving maximal political targeting. The EU seems successful in maximizing the degree of political targeting, while at the same time minimizing the potential damage to its own economy and consumers.

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Explaining formation and design of EU trade agreements: The role of transparency and flexibility

Cited by 17 publications

References 56 publications

The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus

The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus

Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump’s Trade Wars

Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars

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