Explaining How the Mind Works: On the Relation Between Cognitive Science and Philosophy

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that under certain prevalent interpretations of the nature and aims of cognitive science, theories of cognition generate a forced choice between a conception of cognition which depends on the possibility of a private language, and a conception of cognition which depends on mereological confusions. We argue, further, that this should not pose a fundamental problem for cognitive scientists since a plausible interpretation of the nature and aims of cognitive science is available that does not generate this forced choice. The crucial difference between these interpretations is that on the one hand the aim of theories of cognition is to tell us what thinking (etc.) is, and on the other it is to tell us what is causally necessary if an intelligent creature is to be able to think. Our argument draws heavily on a Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy in which no philosophical theory can explain what thinking, perceiving, remembering, etc. are, either. The positive, strictly therapeutic, purpose of a philosophy of cognitive science should be to show that, since the traditional problems which constitute the philosophy of mind are chimerical, there is nothing for philosophical theorizing in cognitive science to achieve.

A Model Hierarchy for Psychological Science

“…Ours is a world in which people manifest a certain number of capacities: They see and hear, have beliefs and preferences, remember things, and engage in all kinds of actions based on a variety of reasons. In light of such capacities, theory development consists of attempts to explain them by making some reference to their causal pre-conditions (e.g., the underlying mechanisms; see Cummins, 2000;Trigg & Kalish, 2011;Weiskopf, 2011).…”

What could cognitive neuroscience tell us about recognition memory?

“…As Trigg and Kalish (2011) point out, confusions necessarily arise when theories use explanations that do not conform to these alternative kinds of analysis. As Trigg and Kalish (2011) point out, confusions necessarily arise when theories use explanations that do not conform to these alternative kinds of analysis.…”

“…That is, the flaw in this reading is that it relies on people having capacities that they do not have (Trigg & Kalish, 2011). Such computations would then be the capacities that constitute recognition2.…”

“…Conditions such as this inhere to the environment and offer the opportunity for the exercise of the capacity (Hyman, 1994). Trigg and Kalish (2011) point out that the distinction between capacities and their causally enabling conditions applies equally well to cognitive capacities such as thinking, reasoning, believing, and remembering. 1 One such condition is that Paul has a hand to grasp the doorknob (if this is the method he uses) and a functional nervous system to activate the requisite muscle contractions to enable Paul to grasp, turn, and pull the doorknob appropriately.…”

“…Our starting point is a set of arguments presented by Bennett and Hacker (2003) and further elaborated by Trigg and Kalish (2011). Both sets of authors draw attention to a fundamental distinction between capacities that humans and other agents may possess and the causally enabling conditions for their exercise.…”