Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee

Franchino, Fabio; Mariotto, Camilla

doi:10.1177/1465116512468216

Cited by 23 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). However, the findings from Costello and Thomson (2013) echo previous work (e.g., Franchino and Mariotto 2012;Thomson and Hosli 2006) in demonstrating that the EU polity does not represent a strong version of bicameralism in Lijphart's (1999) terminology. Rather, we are faced with an atypical version of bicameralism where the first chamber enjoys certain bargaining advantages over the second.…”

Section: How Has the Introduction Of Codecision Changed The More Specsupporting

confidence: 75%

Legislative codecision and its impact on the political system of the European Union

Burns¹,

Rasmussen²,

Reh³

2013

Journal of European Public Policy

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The European Union (EU) has experienced a remarkable degree of change during its history: it legislates in an ever wider range of policy areas, and its institutions and decision-making processes have been reformed repeatedly. One of the most important institutional changes was the introduction of the codecision procedure in 1993, which empowered the European Parliament (EP) and transformed the EU system of governance. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the majority of legislation is now subject to codecision under the ordinary legislative procedure. Consequently, the operation of codecision has major implications for our understanding and analysis of the EU's legislative outputs and for studies of supranational policy-making and systemic evolution more generally. This collection takes stock of 20 years of practising and studying codecision and examines the procedure's long-term implications for the EU's institutions, politics and policies. KEY WORDSBicameralism; codecision; legitimacy; political system. The last two decades have witnessed a lively debate about the origins, functioning and impact of codecision (for a recent literature review, see Rasmussen [2012]). The existing literature can be divided into studies that primarily focus on (a) the practical functioning and institutional development of the procedure (e.g., Farrell and Héritier 2003; Hix 2002; Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfennig 2012), (b) the consequences of codecision for the inter-institutional balance of power between the institutions (e.g., Burns 2005; Kreppel 2002; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000), (c) the intra-institutional repercussions of the EU's legislative practice, for instance on the distribution of power within the institutions (e.g., Farrell and Héritier 2004; Rasmussen 2011), and (d) its normative implications (e.g., Shackleton and Raunio 2003; Stie 2013).Even though the literature covers many aspects of the EU's legislative practice, most studies have analysed the impact of codecision on the distribution of power between the EU's institutions; other developments and repercussions of the procedure have received considerably less attention. Moreover, existing studies rarely combine different theoretical and methodological approaches. In particular, no attempt has been made to assess systematically how the introduction of codecision has affected the functioning of the EU's political system as a whole. Yet there are good grounds for doing so, as the empowerment of the EP under codecision has transformed relations between the EU's constituent institutions and has wider implications for the legitimacy of policy outputs and the wider political system. This collection therefore brings together scholars and practitioners who represent different approaches to codecision, in order to provide a holistic picture of the effects of co-legislation upon the EU's political system. Specifically, it seeks to address the following questions:

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Section: How Has the Introduction Of Codecision Changed The More Specsupporting

confidence: 75%

Legislative codecision and its impact on the political system of the European Union

Burns¹,

Rasmussen²,

Reh³

2013

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…While some important work finds significant power of the supranational institutions in shaping EU policy outcomes (König et al. ), most work describes their power as limited or even negligible (e.g., Costello and Thomson ; Franchino and Mariotto ; Thomson ). For the sake of parsimony, I neglect the supranational institutions in my baseline specification of the territorial model, but incorporate them in alternative specifications below.…”

Section: The Case Of the European Unionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Territorial Representation and the Opinion–Policy Linkage: Evidence from the European Union

Wratil

2018

American J Political Sci

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A key feature of federal systems is the representation of subnational units by "territorial representatives" in policymaking at the federal level. How do such arrangements influence the linkage between public opinion and policy outputs? I argue that policymaking under territorial representation should be systematically skewed toward opinion in those states where citizens care about a policy issue and have a uniform view on it. This claim is tested using a novel data set of policy change in the European Union (EU), covering 211 policy issues and 6,506 observations of opinion-policy dyads. Results show that measures weighting opinion across member states by how much national citizens care about an issue are better predictors of policy change than EU-wide mean opinion. Moreover, congruence between state-level opinion and EU-level policy becomes more likely, the more salient and clear-cut opinion in a member state is. These findings refine our understanding of the opinion-policy linkage under territorial representation.

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“…294(15) TFEU). 5 Despite being of equal size, delegations are potentially not symmetric because the Council is fully represented in the sense that each of its members is involved in the negotiation, whereas the Parliament's delegates are agents whose interests may or may not be completely aligned to those of their principal (see Franchino and Mariotto 2013). Empirically, Rasmussen (2008) finds that the Parliament's conciliation delegation is representative of the chamber as whole.…”

Section: Eu Codecision: Rules and Modelsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Codecision in context: implications for the balance of power in the EU

Maaser

Mayer

2015

Soc Choice Welf

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The paper analyzes the European Union's codecision procedure as a bargaining game between the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The relative influence of these institutions on legislative decision-making in the EU is assessed under a priori preference assumptions. In contrast to previous studies, we do not consider the codecision procedure in isolation but include several aspects of the EU's wider institutional framework. The finding that the Council is more influential than the Parliament due to its more conservative internal decision rule is robust to adding 'context' to the basic model, but the imbalance is considerably attenuated. JEL Classifications

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Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee

Cited by 23 publications

References 39 publications

Legislative codecision and its impact on the political system of the European Union

Legislative codecision and its impact on the political system of the European Union

Territorial Representation and the Opinion–Policy Linkage: Evidence from the European Union

Codecision in context: implications for the balance of power in the EU

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