Explaining our Moral Reliability

Abstract

I critically examine an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. The key premise of the argument is that there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability. I search for the strongest version of the argument; this involves exploring how ‘adequate explanation’ could be understood such that the key premise comes out true. Finally, I give a reductio: in the sense in which there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability, there is equally no adequate explanation of our inductive reliability. Thus, the argument that would debunk our moral views would also, absurdly, debunk all inductive reasoning.

Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough

“…As the skeptic sees it, it is an open question whether there is a hand. Likewise, Moorean responses to the evolutionary debunker start their response with something that is putatively up for debate, for example: survival-promoting behavior is good (Enoch, 2011); society's basic needs are best served by adopting moral standards (Copp, 2007(Copp, , 2008; life-affirming moral beliefs are reliable (Dogramaci, 2017). From there they argue that the debunker's empirical premise is false.…”

Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?

“…This principle has been much discussed (and objected to) in the recent literature. See, for example, Berry (ms), Dogramaci (), Faraci (ms), Klenk (), ch. 7, Tersman (), and Woods ().…”