2001
DOI: 10.2307/449270
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Explaining State Legislators' Casework and Public Resource Allocations

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Cited by 16 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…It is possible that representational tradeoffs arise because of the resource constraints that all legislators face, and women may underperform men on constituency service due to their increased policy activity. Indeed, we know little about gender differences in service responsiveness even though legislators devote a significant amount of time and energy to constituent concerns (Ellickson and Whistler 2001; Fenno 1978; Freeman and Richardson 1996). Constituency service is also a key way in which representatives gain electoral support.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is possible that representational tradeoffs arise because of the resource constraints that all legislators face, and women may underperform men on constituency service due to their increased policy activity. Indeed, we know little about gender differences in service responsiveness even though legislators devote a significant amount of time and energy to constituent concerns (Ellickson and Whistler 2001; Fenno 1978; Freeman and Richardson 1996). Constituency service is also a key way in which representatives gain electoral support.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The average time spent by Canadian councillors falls into this range. As is the case here, Ellickson and Whistler (2001) found in their survey of U.S. state representatives that the most time was spent on policy work. This was followed by time on service work.…”
Section: Time Committed To Service Representationmentioning
confidence: 88%
“…The following district characteristics had been found to affect at least one aspect of engagement and were controlled for: the districts' homogeneity, district magnitude, the districts' population, and the districts' education levels (Clausen, Holmberg, and deHaven-Smith, 1983;Halligan et al, 1988;Richardson and Freeman, 1995;Ellickson and Whistler, 2001). The following legislators' characteristics were controlled for: levels of ambition, length of service, electoral vulnerability, trusteedelegate role orientation, and district-state role orientation (Halligan et al, 1988;Ellickson and Whistler, 2001;Maestas, 2003;Richardson and Freeman, 1995). Additional controls included the professionalism of the legislature and the existence of term limit laws (Maestas, 2003;Ellickson and Whistler, 2001;Richardson and Freeman, 1995;Carey, Niemi, and Powell, 2000:Ch.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The following legislators' characteristics were controlled for: levels of ambition, length of service, electoral vulnerability, trusteedelegate role orientation, and district-state role orientation (Halligan et al, 1988;Ellickson and Whistler, 2001;Maestas, 2003;Richardson and Freeman, 1995). Additional controls included the professionalism of the legislature and the existence of term limit laws (Maestas, 2003;Ellickson and Whistler, 2001;Richardson and Freeman, 1995;Carey, Niemi, and Powell, 2000:Ch. 3;Niemi and Powell, 2003).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%