Explaining the Demand for Sovereignty

Milanović, Branko; Sambanis, Nicholas

doi:10.1596/1813-9450-5888

Cited by 52 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…In other words, both the poorest and the richest groups and districts desire more regionalism. These findings reconcile the fiscal federalism and the marginalization logics (Hechter, 1974;Horowitz, 1985;Alesina and Spolaore, 2003;Sambanis and Milanovic, 2011), as we explain below. Third, individual preferences for regionalism can be explained by individual ethnic attachment-there is much within-group variation.…”

supporting

confidence: 72%

“…We know richer regions and ethnic groups tend to prefer fiscal federalism in order to keep a larger share of the revenue they generate (Sambanis and Milanovic, 2011;Alesina and Spolaore, 2003) even if these demands might generally fall short of secessionism (Horowitz, 1985). At the individual level, richer individuals within a region might prefer more regionalism hoping to (i) retain a larger share of private and public revenues in the region and (ii) enjoy the political spoils, such as the newly created jobs of an expanded bureaucracy (Breton, 1964).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Taking it Personally: the Effect of Ethnic Attachment on Preferences for Regionalism

Ricart-Huguet

Green

2017

St Comp Int Dev

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This paper presents three related findings on regional decentralization. We use an original dataset collected in Uganda to establish, for the first time in a developing country context, that individuals have meaningful preferences over the degree of regional decentralization they desire, ranging from centralism to secessionism. Second, multilevel models suggest that a small share of this variation is explained at the district and ethnic group levels. The preference for regional decentralization monotonically increases with an ethnic group or district's average ethnic attachment. However, the relationship with an ethnic group or district's income is U-shaped: both the richest and the poorest groups desire more regionalism, reconciling interest and identity-based explanations for regionalism. Finally, we show that higher individual ethnic attachment increases preferences for regionalism using fixed effects and a new matching method. Abstract This paper presents three related findings on regional decentralization. We use an original dataset collected in Uganda to establish, for the first time in a developing country context, that individuals have meaningful preferences over the degree of regional decentralization they desire, ranging from centralism to secessionism. Second, multilevel models suggest that a small share of this variation is explained at the district and ethnic group levels. The preference for regional decentralization monotonically increases with an ethnic group or district's average ethnic attachment. However, the relationship with an ethnic group or district's income is U-shaped: both the richest and the poorest groups desire more regionalism, reconciling interest and identity-based explanations for regionalism. Finally, we show that higher individual ethnic attachment increases preferences for regionalism using fixed effects and a new matching method.

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supporting

confidence: 72%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking it Personally: the Effect of Ethnic Attachment on Preferences for Regionalism

Ricart-Huguet

Green

2017

St Comp Int Dev

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“…A high level of economic inequality within an ethnic group may create resentment, which undermines cohesiveness and the group's ability to take collective action, as the different social classes within the group identify more closely with their counterparts in other ethnic groups rather than identifying with the member of their own ethnicity but from a different social class (Stewart, 2000). Related to this, Sambanis and Milanovic (2011) argue that intra-regional inequality will undermine mobilization, since any income gains from victory will have to be distributed among the population. Thus, an increase in economic inequality within an ethnic group should reduce the likelihood that this group rebels.…”

Section: Inequality and Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unequal We Fight: Between- and Within-Group Inequality and Ethnic Civil War

Kuhn¹,

Weidmann²

2015

PSRM

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Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. AbstractWhen and why ethnic groups rebel remains a central puzzle in the civil war literature. In this paper we examine how different types of inequalities affect both an ethnic group's willingness and opportunity to fight. We argue that political and economic inter-group inequalities motivate ethnic groups to initiate a fight against the state, and that intra-group economic inequality lowers their elite's costs of providing the necessary material and/or purposive incentives to overcome collective action problems inherent to rebel recruitment. We therefore predict that internally unequal ethnic groups excluded from power and/or significantly richer or poorer relative to the country's average are most likely to engage in a civil war. To assess our claim empirically, we develop a new global measure of economic inequality by combining high resolution satellite images of light emissions, spatial population data, and geocoded ethnic settlement areas. After validating our measure at the country-and group-level we include it in a standard statistical model of civil war onset and find considerable support for our theoretical prediction: greater economic inequality within an ethnic group significantly increases the risk of conflict, especially if political or economic inequalities between groups provide a motive.

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“…Scholars such as Sorens (2005) and Sambanis and Milanovic (2011) posit that individuals are more likely to pursue secession or autonomy for their region if they expect that the new arrangement will improve their community's welfare in cultural, political and/or economic grounds. Therefore individuals tend be more supportive of secessionist options if they live in regions that are very different than the rest of the country.…”

Section: The Role Of Local Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%