Explaining Ugandan intervention in Congo: evidence and interpretations

Clark, John F.

doi:10.1017/s0022278x01003615

Cited by 71 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…As noted at the paper’s outset, diamonds, timber and gold also motivated Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in the conflicts of 1996–1997 and 1998–2003 (Clark, 2001; Fearon, 2004; Montague and Berrigan, 2001; Nest et al, 2006; Ross, 2004a). These two states trained and armed rebels in exchange for the ability to exploit natural mineral deposits.…”

Section: Contextualizing the Statistical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Diamonds, gold, coltan, copper, cobalt, timber, uranium, oil, precious gems and narcotics are among the DRC’s immense natural resource wealth. At various times during the protracted conflict, there is evidence that Belgium, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Rwanda were resource-motivated (Clark, 2001; Global Witness, 2009; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2008). Belgium even encouraged the secession of Katanga in 1960 owing to lootable resource interests in the area (Marcum, 1961).…”

Section: Contextualizing the Statistical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Lootable resources and third-party intervention into civil wars

Findley¹,

Marineau²

2014

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Third parties intervene in ongoing civil wars frequently and at times with nefarious intentions. In this paper, we consider the possibility that lootable natural resources motivate third parties to intervene in wars on the side of the opposition. Such resources offer a host of benefits to the intervener, including resource extraction and greater likelihood of rebel success. When rebels have access to lootable resources, we hypothesize that third parties will be more likely to intervene on the side of the rebels and simultaneously less likely to intervene on behalf of the government. Rare-events logit and split population (mixture-cure) survival models, in conjunction with close attention to the mechanisms found in individual cases, offer support for the theoretical argument. This paper advances our understanding of the motivations for intervention into civil war by highlighting the largely neglected role of economic factors in motivating opposition-biased interventions. It further adds insights into the role of natural resources in civil wars by shifting emphasis away from domestic combatants towards the motives of outside states.

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Section: Contextualizing the Statistical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Contextualizing the Statistical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lootable resources and third-party intervention into civil wars

Findley¹,

Marineau²

2014

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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“…The Kinshasa Government started cultivating its relations with Hutu exiles and refugees and its already provocative anti-Tutsi rhetoric reached incendiary levels of intensity. Rwanda's ally in the previous actions against the DRC, Uganda, was clearly alarmed by what could be a Rwandan bid for regional dominance and thus struck out on its own, increasing its support of pro-Uganda armed groups, such as the MLC and RCDKisangani, in the north-eastern areas of the DRC (Clark 2001). When the rebels advanced quickly and threatened Kinshasa, the Kabila Senior Government requested SADC's assistance and the SADC agreed.…”

Section: Managing the Interstate Spoilersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing Spoilers in a Hybrid War: The Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2010)

Fuamba

Yonekawa

Seegers³

2013

Politikon

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Scholarship on the management of spoilers in a hybrid type of conflict is almost non-existent. Through an examination of the recent Congolese wars and peace efforts (1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010), we develop an understanding of how spoilers are managed in a conflict characterised by both interstate and intrastate dynamics. Certainly, more strategies of dealing with spoiler behaviours in this type of conflict are likely to emerge as similar cases are investigated, but our discussion recommends these non-related, but strongly interacting principles: the practice of inclusivity, usually preferred in the management of spoilers, is more complex, and in fact ineffective, particularly when concerned groups' internal politics and supportive alliances are unconventional. Because holding elections is often deemed indispensable in peacemaking efforts, it is vital that total spoilers be prevented from winning or disrupting them. The toughest challenge is the protection of civilians, especially when the state lacks a monopoly on the use of violence and governance remains partitioned across the country.

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“…Uganda, which supported Kabila's war to oust Mobutu, later received permission from Kabila to enter the DRC in pursuit of rebels threatening its borders and population. 112 The case of Angola offers another example of intervention in a neighboring state that assisted a domestic foe. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (known by the Portuguese acronym UNITA) fought against the Angolan government from independence, in 1975, until 2002.…”

Section: When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors 163mentioning

confidence: 99%

When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict

Atzili

2007

International Security

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Since the end of World War II, the norm of fixed borders—the proscription against foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory—has gained prevalence in world politics. Although the norm seeks to make the world a more peaceful place, it may instead cause it to become more conflict prone. Among sociopolitically weak states—states that lack legitimate and effective governmental institutions—fixed borders can actually increase instability and conflict. Adherence to the norm of fixed borders can lead to the perpetuation and exacerbation of weakness in states that are already weak or that have just gained independence. It does so by depriving states of what was traditionally the most potent incentive to increase efforts of state building: territorial pressures. By creating conditions that are rife for the spillover of civil wars and by supplying opportunities for foreign predation, sociopolitically weak states in a world of fixed borders have become a major source of interstate conflict in much of the developing world. Investigation into one case, the war in Congo, reveals the plausibility and the potential force of this argument. Good fences indeed can make bad neighbors.

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Explaining Ugandan intervention in Congo: evidence and interpretations

Cited by 71 publications

References 12 publications

Lootable resources and third-party intervention into civil wars

Lootable resources and third-party intervention into civil wars

Managing Spoilers in a Hybrid War: The Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2010)

When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict

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