2015
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-014-9294-z
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Explaining Universal Social Institutions: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Abstract: Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provide… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
8
0

Year Published

2018
2018
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
4

Relationship

3
1

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
(8 citation statements)
references
References 11 publications
0
8
0
Order By: Relevance
“…As Ostrom (1990) points out, in order to preserve common-pool resources from depletion, the use of such resources must be regulated and monitored and infractions must be punished. Such norm enforcement can be found in all human societies [see Vlerick (2016) for an extensive account].…”
Section: Game Changersmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…As Ostrom (1990) points out, in order to preserve common-pool resources from depletion, the use of such resources must be regulated and monitored and infractions must be punished. Such norm enforcement can be found in all human societies [see Vlerick (2016) for an extensive account].…”
Section: Game Changersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This evolutionary approach, I believe, is valuable and important. It seeks to provide a scientific understanding of the foundations of human societies (see also Vlerick 2016).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a non-institutional context where property is not enforced, individual actors will often benefit more from adopting predatory strategies to acquire goods than take the risk of producing goods. The result at the group level is detrimental, since the total amount of resources in this "non-cooperative equilibrium" will be inferior to the amount in the "cooperative equilibrium" where property is sanctioned and since there will be costly conflict (Vlerick, 2016). Many problems, however, are somewhere on a continuum between pure coordination and pure competition.…”
Section: Why Do Social Institutions Emerge?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These institutions imposed punishments on individuals who threatened the harmony and cooperation within the group. Doing so, they protected that harmony and cooperation (Vlerick, 2016). But religion also played an important role.…”
Section: How Do Religions Solve Problems Of Cooperation?mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation