Explanations of exceptions in biology: corrective asymmetry versus autonomy

Raerinne, Jani

doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1195-9

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…I should point out that this conclusion is broadly supported by other work in this literature, such as(Richardson 2008;Keeley 2000;Raerinne 2017). …”

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confidence: 80%

Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective

Ross¹

2020

Philos. of Sci.

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This paper examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of this framework are found in an influential paper by Sober (1999), in which he argues that the multiple realizability thesis poses no challenge to reductive explanation. While Sober's causal approach has the potential to reveal new insights, I argue that his set up fails to capture important aspects of the multiple realizability thesis. After correcting for these issues, I argue that this causal framework reveals something quite different. It reveals how multiple realizability relates to a common type of causal complexity in biology that poses problems for reductive explanation.

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“…I should point out that this conclusion is broadly supported by other work in this literature, such as(Richardson 2008;Keeley 2000;Raerinne 2017). …”

supporting

confidence: 80%

Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective

Ross¹

2020

Philos. of Sci.

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“…Rather, Hutchinson presented a genuine ad hoc hypothesis, which had one purpose: to save another hypothesis from its falsification. Second, this practice of explaining away exceptions is common in ecology (see Raerinne, 2017 and references therein).…”

Section: Is Ecology a Popperian Science?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Popperian ecology is a delusion

Raerinne

2024

Ecology and Evolution

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During the last 50 years, a group of ecologists has repeatedly used Popper's falsificationism in normative claims concerning how research in ecology should be conducted and/or how ecology should be corrected. Other ecologists seem to be dissatisfied with these criticisms. Nevertheless, they have not provided systematic analyses of how and why the Popperian criticisms of ecology fail. I have two aims in this article First, I show how so‐called Popperian ecologists have not only failed to use but have misused – if not abused – Popper in their criticisms of ecology. That is, the Popperian criticisms of ecology lack the justification the critics claim it has. Second, I claim that Popper's falsificationism is an unsuitable philosophy of science for ecology. In other words, ecology should not be criticized nor evaluated from the Popperian perspective in the first place.

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Abstraction in ecology: reductionism and holism as complementary heuristics

Raerinne

2017

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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In addition to their core explanatory and predictive assumptions, scientific models include simplifying assumptions, which function as idealizations, approximations, and abstractions. There are methods to investigate whether simplifying assumptions bias the results of models, such as robustness analyses. However, the equally important issuethe focus of this paperhas received less attention, namely, what are the methodological and epistemic strengths and limitations associated with different simplifying assumptions. I concentrate on one type of simplifying assumption, the use of mega parameters as abstractions in ecological models. First, I argue that there are two kinds of mega parameters qua abstractions, sufficient parameters and aggregative parameters, which have gone unnoticed in the literature. The two are associated with different heuristics, holism and reductionism, which many view as incompatible. Second, I will provide a different analysis of abstractions and the associated heuristics than previous authors. Reductionism and holism and the accompanying abstractions have different methodological and epistemic functions, strengths, and limitations, and the heuristics should be viewed as providing complementary research perspectives of cognitively limited beings. This is then, third, used as a premise to argue for epistemic and methodological pluralism in theoretical ecology. Finally, the presented taxonomy of abstractions is used to comment on the current debate whether mechanistic accounts of explanation are compatible with the use of abstractions. This debate has suffered from an abstract discussion of abstractions. With a better taxonomy of abstractions the debate can be resolved.

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Explanations of exceptions in biology: corrective asymmetry versus autonomy

Cited by 3 publications

References 44 publications

Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective

Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective

Popperian ecology is a delusion

Abstraction in ecology: reductionism and holism as complementary heuristics

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