Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry

Abstract

Philip Kitcher has proposed a theory of explanation based on the notion of unification. Despite the genuine interest and power of the theory, I argue here that the theory suffers from a fatal deficiency: It is intrinsically unable to account for the asymmetric structure of explanation, and thus ultimately falls prey to a problem similar to the one which beset Hempel's D-N model. I conclude that Kitcher is wrong to claim that one can settle the issue of an argument's explanatory force merely on the basis of considerations about the unifying power of the argument pattern the argument instantiates.

A Defense Of A Unificationist Theory Of Explanation

“…Barnes (1992) argues that there are cases where unificationist explanations conflicts with our intuitions of explanation. We can illustrate this with a closed system S whose laws are temporally symmetric: Assume that there is a class E of facts in need of explanation.…”

Contextualism, explanation and the social sciences

“…The asymmetry of explanation is also not easily accounted for on unificationist accounts (see Barnes 1992), while the asymmetry of causation does so. Moreover, the role of unification can be accounted for in ways that do not make it basic to explanation.…”

Inference, explanation, and asymmetry

“…Nevertheless, Eric Barnes' (1992) version of the symmetry problem threatens Kitcher's version of EAI. Barnes imagines a closed system of "Newtonian particles."…”

“…For instance, Bromberger (1965) used symmetry to critique Hempel's (1965) covering-law model of explanation. Similarly, Kitcher's (1989) unificationist theory purported to restore explanation's asymmetry, but it faced other, searching symmetry problems (see Barnes, 1992). By contrast, the symmetry problem has been a great advertisement for causal approaches to explanation.…”