Explicationist Epistemology and Epistemic Pluralism

Olsson, Erik J

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_2

Cited by 6 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Explicationist epistemology can unify epistemology by providing a general, historically respectable methodological foundation and solve some of its long-standing problems (Olsson 2017). The unificatory benefits would include all the systematic advantages that normally follow from something being subsumable under a general and historically respectable standard methodology.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 One way of relating explicationist epistemology to other methodologies is to view the latter as degenerate or improper limit cases of the former. In particular, three schools (suitably qualified) can be reconstructed as assigning zero (or very low) weight to all requirement on an explication, except the first: similarity to the ordinary concept (Olsson 2017). They are Oxford style ordinary language philosophy, experimental epistemology (e.g.…”

Section: Explicationist Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Apart from Olsson, Lehrer (1990) and Baumann (2016) advocate explication as their method of choice in epistemology. Olsson (2017) argues that Goldman (1999) implicitly assumes explication or a similar methodology when equating knowledge with true belief for the purposes of (veritistic) social epistemology. 7 Brun (2016) is a useful and informed overview of the state of the art, including the challenges that face practitioners of explicationism.…”

Section: Explicationist Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a remedy, Olsson (2017) proposed that Carnap's method of explication, with its roots in philosophy of science, could be a suitable vehicle for unifying epistemology and coming to grips with some of its long-standing problems. The unificatory benefits would include all the systematic advantages that normally follow from something being subsumable under a general and historically respectable standard methodology, e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Why the focus onKornblith and Williamson? One answer is thatOlsson (2017) does not give an explicationist perspective on their undertakings and yet the latter are of undisputed value and originality. Having said this, the choice of the two is to some extent arbitrary; there are many other distinguished epistemologists for whom the same question could be raised: can their insights be accommodated within an explicationist framework?…”

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confidence: 99%

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Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge

Olsson

2021

J Gen Philos Sci

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It has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the neighboring field of philosophy of science. However, it is unclear to what extent epistemological theories that emphasize the explanatory role of knowledge fit into this picture, Kornblith’s natural kind epistemology and Williamson’s knowledge first approach being cases in point. In this connection, I raise three questions. Can we harvest the insights of these approaches without loss in the more standard and less idiosyncratic explicationist framework? Can we do so without falling prey to prominent criticism raised against those approaches? Finally, do the approaches come out as coherent under an explicationist rendering? I argue that in Kornblith’s case the answer to all three questions is essentially in the affirmative. Much of the knowledge first approach is also translatable into explicationism. However, from that perspective, Williamson’s central argument for treating knowledge as undefinable, referring to persistent yet unsuccessful attempts to solve the Gettier problem, amounts to an overreaction to that problem. Leaving explicationism aside, I ask, in the penultimate section, what Williamson’s own philosophical method really amounts to.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Explicationist Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Explicationist Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge

Olsson

2021

J Gen Philos Sci

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The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection

Stephens

Tjøstheim

2020

Erkenn

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Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option.

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Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality

Eder

2021

Synthese

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A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when explicating the concept of rationality. My position thus amounts to an instrumentalist position about theories of epistemic rationality. Since there are different purposes, or goals, for which theories of rationality are proposed, the method of explication leaves room for different characterizations of rationality. I focus on two such (kinds of) purposes: first, the purpose of guiding the formation (or maintenance) of doxastic states and, second, the purpose of assessing (the formation or maintenance of) doxastic states. I conclude by outlining a pluralistic picture concerning rationality.

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Explicationist Epistemology and Epistemic Pluralism

Cited by 6 publications

References 16 publications

Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge

Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge

The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection

Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality

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