2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.csi.2009.04.004
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Exploiting an antivirus interface

Abstract: We propose a technique for defeating signature-based malware detectors by exploiting information disclosed by antivirus interfaces. This information is leveraged to reverse engineer relevant details of the detector's underlying signature database, revealing binary obfuscations that suffice to conceal malware from the detector. Experiments with real malware and antivirus interfaces on Windows operating systems justifies the effectiveness of our approach.

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Cited by 30 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Modification of the malware code features used by a decision tree classifier on the basis of static analysis was presented in the work of Hamlen et al 18 The features used by the classification process were binary n-gram-a specific byte sequence (equals to sub-string of bytes) in the binary, collected via static analysis. The authors have con- the authors used feature insertion on the attacker's code to manually transform its feature set to the one found.…”
Section: Camouflage Algorithmsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Modification of the malware code features used by a decision tree classifier on the basis of static analysis was presented in the work of Hamlen et al 18 The features used by the classification process were binary n-gram-a specific byte sequence (equals to sub-string of bytes) in the binary, collected via static analysis. The authors have con- the authors used feature insertion on the attacker's code to manually transform its feature set to the one found.…”
Section: Camouflage Algorithmsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As shown in the work of Hamlen et al, 18 an IDS decision tree can be recovered this way by exploiting public interfaces of an IDS and building the decision tree by feeding it with many samples and examining their classifications. Such knowledge can be gained by reverse engineering the IDS on the attacker's computer, without the need to gain access to the attacked system-one just needs access to IDS.…”
Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One way to address this problem is to update the signatures, which achieves superior adaptability over current polymorphic malware. While this advantage has kept antivirus products mostly ahead in the virus-antivirus co-evolution race [16] up to the present time, a malware detector needs to be adaptive to cope with the changes in the wild.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the escalating rate of new malware appearances and the advent of self-mutating, polymorphic malware over the past decade have made manual signature updating less practical. This has led to the development of automated data mining techniques for malware detection (e.g., Kolter and Maloof [2004], Schultz et al [2001], Masud et al [2008a], and Hamlen et al [2009] executable. These malware detectors are first trained so that they can generalize the distinction between malicious and benign executables, and thus detect future instances of malware.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%