Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness

Abstract

Subjects in economic experiments are often generous. This behavior is often interpreted as reflecting a preference for equitable, efficient, or otherwise desirable social outcomes. We show that a considerable proportion of such fair behavior may be driven by a desire to appear fair without actually wanting a fair outcome. To do so, we first demonstrate a high frequency of fair behavior in a modification of the standard dictator game, but then show that fairness decreases substantially when the connection between choices and outcomes is obfuscated.Specifically, we show that in a binary version of the dictator game, a majority of subjects choose the fair and efficient outcome. We then show that subjects playing the same game instead choose to maximize their own payoffs, at the expense of fairness and efficiency, when the recipients' payoffs are uncertain, even if this uncertainty can be costlessly resolved.We also find that when either of two subjects can sacrifice to implement a fair and efficient outcome, but neither can ensure fairness or inefficiency, selfishness prevails. Finally, we also find less fair behavior when unfair outcomes can plausibly result from an external factor rather than just the dictator's choice.Our results indicate that much fair behavior may reflect motivations other than simply a preference for desirable social outcomes. Instead, much of the behavior in our experiments is consistent with a desire to pursue self-interest, while maintaining the illusion of behaving fairly.2 Do people share with others because they want to, or because they feel they have to in certain situations? This paper explores the motivation for fair behavior. In particular, we explore whether experimental demonstrations of people sacrificing monetary payoffs to benefit others truly represent evidence of concern for others' welfare or for desirable social outcomes. To do so, we use experimental manipulations that allow subjects to leave the relationship between their actions and others' outcomes uncertain. These manipulations thus allow subjects to choose selfishly without knowing whether they negatively impact others' payoffs. However, in our manipulations subjects may always implement the fair outcome with certainty if they so desire. We find significantly less generous behavior in these manipulations relative to a baseline in which the relationship between actions and others' outcomes is certain, as in the standard dictator game. This finding occurs in spite of the fact that the recipients are anonymous and cannot retaliate. We conclude that people are often fair because they intrinsically dislike appearing unfair, either to themselves or others.

Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers?

“…As indicated above, several aspects of dictator behavior seem inconsistent with standard economic models of selfishness or altruism where preferences are defined over material outcomes. For example, Dana et al (2007) compared a binary choice baseline, in which a large majority of dictators preferred the "fair" allocation (5, 5) to the "unfair" alternative (6, 1), with alternative treatments enabling dictators to obscure the relationship between their actions and the resulting outcomes. In these alternative treatments, generosity was significantly lower than in the baseline case.…”

“…7 [ Table 1 about here] All subjects participated in one experiment consisting of two parts. 8 The uncertainty in the first of these treatments was introduced partly in order to obscure the consequences for the recipient of exiting, since previous evidence indicates that this decreases subjects' generosity (Dana, Weber and Kuang 2007;Lazear et al 2006). In addition, however, it provides a chance to observe behavior of subjects who prefer to exit, but who are nevertheless placed in a dictator situation.…”

“…If so, can this be attributed to a higher degree of altruism, the way this concept has been defined in the economics literature? 2 Part 2 of our experiment is inspired by the work of Dana, Cain and Dawes (2006); Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007); Lazear et al (2006), and Broberg et al (2007). These authors show that when subjects are given the option to exit a dictator game, or when the consequence for others of the dictator's choice is obscured, generosity is substantially reduced.…”

Sharing one’s fortune? An experimental study on earned income and giving

“…This reasoning is related to the notion that people take advantage of "moral wiggle room" to act self-interestedly as shown in Dana et al (2007). They found that, when there is uncertainty about the relationship between a dictator's actions and outcomes, subjects choose more frequently the selfish action.…”

Fairness Ideals, Hidden Selfishness, and Opportunistic Behavior: An Experimental Approach

“…However, this paper does not take into account the liberal egalitarian concept the experimental design produces little evidence for it. 6 Since utilitarianism is equal to completely selfish behavior, one's self-distribution amount * approaches to a strict utilitarian as one's load factor on material utility 1 approaches one: lim…”