That science is more than the unilinear application of general theories to specific empirical circumstances is, one hopes, no longer something that is controversial or requires detailed argument. To be sure, there were times when devising universally applicable theories was seen as the most worthy task of science, with less lofty activities such as experimentation and scientific modeling being relegated to the underbelly of "proper science." Arguing for a pluralistic recognition of the diversity of scientific practices, methods, and goals, might-at least on the pages of this journal-amount to preaching to the converted. Yet, once the diversity and heterogeneity of science is acknowledged, the real work only starts: for, the task of systematizing the manifold ways in which science proceeds when it is not aiming for the testing of theories has continued to elude scholars. Philosophers are perhaps especially challenged in this regard: whereas historians of science and scholars of science and technology studies have been able to fill this lacuna with insightful case studies that demonstrate the richness of science beyond the pursuit of theory, philosophers of science have remained perhaps too wedded to binary distinctions such as the contrast between justification and discovery.Perhaps the most prominent site where scientific activity comes into contact with the world is the experiment, and so it is not surprising that the practice turn within history and philosophy of science also led to the recognition of the significance and autonomy of scientific experimentation. Karl Popper's