Abstract:This study of the state frontline workforce breaks new ground by conducting an institutional analysis of rule abidance in the People's Republic of China (PRC). We draw upon a survey (n = 1,721) of Chengguan officers, the main players in regulatory enforcement of civil law in urban China, to explore the influence of autocratic one‐party rule on the meaning of and variation in rule abidance in China. The majority of Chengguan officers are rule followers, and demographic differences show little deviation from thi… Show more
“…To reverse the traditional weak and selective enforcement of water‐related and environmental laws (Linster and Yang ), rule‐following leaders emphasize the importance of executing legislation consistently. In their study on rule abidance among Chinese frontline officers, Zang and Musheno () found that the majority were rule followers. Rule following ensures predictability and prevents abuses of power and corruption that can seriously hurt the government's legitimacy and threaten one‐party rule (Zhu, Huang, and Zhang ).…”
Section: Theory and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
To advance understanding of leadership in the public sector, this article examines the link between accountability, rule‐following, political loyalty, and network governance approaches to leadership and employees' public service motivation (PSM) and individual job performance. Using a sample of 300 civil servants and their 64 managers in China, the study finds that accountability, rule‐following, political loyalty, and network governance leadership are all significantly positively related to employees' PSM levels and job performance. The results of multilevel modeling show that network governance leadership has the strongest positive relationship with both PSM and job performance, suggesting that managers should encourage public employees to initiate and maintain contacts outside their organizations to access relevant information, technical expertise, and resources that may be not be available internally.
“…To reverse the traditional weak and selective enforcement of water‐related and environmental laws (Linster and Yang ), rule‐following leaders emphasize the importance of executing legislation consistently. In their study on rule abidance among Chinese frontline officers, Zang and Musheno () found that the majority were rule followers. Rule following ensures predictability and prevents abuses of power and corruption that can seriously hurt the government's legitimacy and threaten one‐party rule (Zhu, Huang, and Zhang ).…”
Section: Theory and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
To advance understanding of leadership in the public sector, this article examines the link between accountability, rule‐following, political loyalty, and network governance approaches to leadership and employees' public service motivation (PSM) and individual job performance. Using a sample of 300 civil servants and their 64 managers in China, the study finds that accountability, rule‐following, political loyalty, and network governance leadership are all significantly positively related to employees' PSM levels and job performance. The results of multilevel modeling show that network governance leadership has the strongest positive relationship with both PSM and job performance, suggesting that managers should encourage public employees to initiate and maintain contacts outside their organizations to access relevant information, technical expertise, and resources that may be not be available internally.
“…Our ambition was to inductively identify a variety of perverse effects and to establish a theoretical understanding of the nature of these perverse effects and their relation to key features of public innovation. This resulted in the following set of articles and books: Altshuler and Behn (1997), Ansell and Torfing (2014), Borins (2001Borins ( , 2002, Bekkers et al (2006Bekkers et al ( , 2011, Brandsen et al (2016), Brown and Osborne (2013), De Vries et al (2016), Fuglsang and Sundbo (2016), Hartley (2005), Jordan (2014), Moore and Hartley (2008), Osborne and Brown (2005), O'Toole (1997), Roberts and King (1996), Sørensen and Torfing (2011), Voorberg et al (2015), Windrum and Koch (2008), and Zang and Musheno (2017). We analyzed these key sources in the literature on public innovation for information about and examples of perverse effects.…”
Section: Strategy For Mapping the Dark Side Of Public Innovationmentioning
The positive features of innovation are well known but the dark side of public innovation has received less attention. To fill this gap, this article develops a theoretical understanding of the dark side of public innovation. We explore a diversity of perverse effects on the basis of a literature review and an expert consultation. We indicate that these perverse effects can be categorized on two dimensions: low public value and low public control. We confront this exploratory analysis with the literature and conclude that the perverse effects are not coincidental but emerge from key properties of innovation processes such as creating niches for innovation and accepting uncertainty about public value outcomes. To limit perverse effects, we call for the dynamic assessment of public innovation. The challenge for innovators is to acknowledge the dark side and take measures to prevent perverse effects without killing the innovativeness of organizations.
“…On the other hand, supervisors bear little risk for rule deviation, because they can use their subordinates as scapegoats if things go wrong. Shifting blame to subordinates is a common survival strategy for government officials in China (Zang and Musheno ). Thus, we propose two hypotheses with respect to organizational red tape and bureaucratic power: Hypothesis 5 : Bureaucrats who perceive a high level of red tape will exhibit a higher level of corruptibility, all other factors being equal. Hypothesis 6 : Bureaucrats with greater bureaucratic power will have a higher level of corruptibility, all other factors being equal.…”
Section: A Comprehensive Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other hand, supervisors bear little risk for rule deviation, because they can use their subordinates as scapegoats if things go wrong. Shifting blame to subordinates is a common survival strategy for government officials in China (Zang and Musheno 2017). Thus, we propose two hypotheses with respect to organizational red tape and bureaucratic power:…”
A large body of research focuses on the institutional factors that shape country‐level corruption and the effectiveness of macro‐level anticorruption measures; however, corruption at the individual level remains understudied and thus poorly understood. This article examines the underlying causes of and mechanisms through which individual government bureaucrats engage in corruption. The researchers develop a framework that incorporates intrinsic motivations, work‐related opportunities, and work‐related well‐being to test the ways in which these micro‐level factors shape bureaucrats' propensity to engage in corrupt behaviors (or corruptibility). Using survey data from more than 1,300 Chinese public employees, the authors identify direct and indirect effects on corruptibility and discuss theoretical and practical implications.
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