Exploring governance of the new European Banking Authority—A case for harmonization?

Masciandaro, Donato; Nieto, María J.; Quintyn, Marc

doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2011.03.001

Cited by 20 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…This is directly relevant to some elements of the new EU economic governance such as the EBA and the Single Supervisory Mechanism that was created within the ECB as these organisms are intended to behave independently from politics. The EBA scores relatively well for accountability in a study by Masciandaro (2011), but this is explained mainly by the fact that its 'role is only backed by limited enforcement and sanctioning powers. Its powers are even more limited vis-à-vis individual financial institutions, including in the collection of information on the financial condition of banks' (Masciandaro 2011).…”

Section: Impact On Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 95%

“…The EBA scores relatively well for accountability in a study by Masciandaro (2011), but this is explained mainly by the fact that its 'role is only backed by limited enforcement and sanctioning powers. Its powers are even more limited vis-à-vis individual financial institutions, including in the collection of information on the financial condition of banks' (Masciandaro 2011). With the removal of financial supervision to the ECB this positive accountability situation might well change.…”

Section: Impact On Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 95%

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The New EU Economic Governance: Vertical and Horizontal Power Shifts

Naert

2013

SSRN Journal

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The euro crisis made visible the omitted stage in the European integration process. The EU jumped from the common market straight to the monetary union, neglecting the formation of the economic union. The new EU economic governance is a combination of a vertical shift of competences, i.e. from one level of government to another level, and a horizontal shift of powers and competences, i.e. from elected governments to unelected government bodies entrusted with (parts of) government policies, from discretionary policy towards rules. In both types there is a risk of accountability problems, although of a different kind. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the new EU economic governance within the conceptual framework of these vertical and horizontal shifts. This two-dimensional approach offers a better analytical tool than the more traditional one-dimensional fiscal federalism approach. In the first part of the paper the focus is on the policy domains that are the objects in the shifting process. Budgetary policy mainly is at stake, but also banking regulation and monetary policy are partly involved. The second part of the paper deals with the relevant aspects of the theories on the division of powers along vertical and horizontal lines. The fiscal federalism approach to vertical separation and the time consistency theory on the horizontal distribution of power are briefly exposed. In the third part the power shifts occurring within the new EU economic governance are presented and defined in terms of our framework of vertical and horizontal power shifts. Finally the accountability problems of these shifts are analyzed.JEL Codes: E58, H77, L38

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Section: Impact On Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Impact On Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 95%

The New EU Economic Governance: Vertical and Horizontal Power Shifts

Naert

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…Macro-prudential regulations, particularly the question of how to deal with systemic risk and Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), were left for further regulatory proposals by the Financial Stability Board. Into this vacuum stepped EU and US authorities, proposing far-sighted new regulatory acts and creating a complex regulatory infrastructure, based on a number of newly created institutions (Masciandaro et al 2011). To deal with systemic risk, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), chaired by the President of ECB, and in the US the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, were created.…”

Section: The Foundations Of New European Supervisory Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Consequences of Post-Crisis Regulatory Architecture for Banks in Central Eastern Europe

2012

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In response to the financial crisis of 2008, the global banking industry has been undergoing fundamental regulatory changes, imposed by the Basel III Agreement, the 2010 US Dodd-Frank Act and the introduction of a new European supervisory structure. This paper analyses the possible long-term impact of this new regulatory framework on the banking sectors of CEE-5 countries. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion on the anticipated long-term impact of the new regulatory environment for bank stability and efficiency, with a focus on host countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The main research question is whether the post crisis regulatory and supervisory architecture, based on a new macro and micro institutional framework, will have a positive impact on banks in CEE. To answer these questions, we analyse the condition of CEE-5 banking sectors. In particular, we are looking how banks in CEE-5 reacted to two different periods: the pre-crisis period of a dynamic economic and credit market growth and the period of global economic and financial collapse (2008), using DEA methodology, measures of market competitive conditions and bank stability index Z-score.

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“…Our findings shed light on the similarities and differences in the supervisory setting around the world. Such knowledge can be particularly useful to assess the degree of convergence among national supervisory architectures in newly established communities of banking supervisors, as it is the case in the European Union (Masciandaro et al 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Banking supervision and external auditors: Theory and empirics

Masciandaro

Peia

Romelli

2020

Journal of Financial Stability

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This paper investigates the role of external auditors in banking sector supervision from a theoretical, institutional and empirical perspective. We first present a simple principalagent framework that highlights the importance of several institutional characteristics in determining the optimal involvement of external auditors in supervision. We then construct a new index that captures the degree of involvement of external auditors in the oversight of the banking sector in 115 countries. Consistent with our theoretical arguments, we find that countries that increase the role of central banks in supervision are also more likely to involve auditors, suggesting that the added complexity of a supervisory function is likely to benefit from the expertise of an external auditor. Having experienced a financial crisis is also associated with a higher use of auditors, particularly among central banks with an increasing role in supervision, which suggests some reputational concerns of the supervisor. Finally, we show that higher audit quality is associated with an increased involvement of auditors in supervision.

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Exploring governance of the new European Banking Authority—A case for harmonization?

Cited by 20 publications

References 11 publications

The New EU Economic Governance: Vertical and Horizontal Power Shifts

The New EU Economic Governance: Vertical and Horizontal Power Shifts

The Consequences of Post-Crisis Regulatory Architecture for Banks in Central Eastern Europe

Banking supervision and external auditors: Theory and empirics

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