Exploring Performance-Related Pay as an Anticorruption Tool

Abstract

The last decades' reform of public administrations has in numerous countries included the use of performance-related pay (PRP). Such programs have been said to reduce civil servants' incentives for bribe taking and have therefore been promoted as an anticorruption tool. However, the article proposes that such schemes' suppressing effect on corruption incentives is questionable in highly corrupt settings because the absence of non-corrupt senior managers-and hence independent performance evaluations-may lead to the capture of such programs. An in-depth study of reforms in the South African civil service provides micro-level insights into the process in which such schemes may fail. The investigation outlines how PRP bonuses are used as rewards from corrupt senior managers to colluding subordinates. Honest bureaucrats are instead isolated and receive no addition to their salary. These selective rewards make honest behavior increasingly costly and function as an incentive for civil servants to engage in bribery.

Understanding the Micro-Foundations of Administrative Corruption in the Public Sector: Findings from a Systematic Literature Review

“…If civil servants hold control beliefs that authority must not be questioned, leadership as the process of signaling the normative benchmark for ) but its foundation is also distrust in the integrity of institutions (Sööt and Rootalu 2012;Pelletier and Bligh 2008). Strong personal intra-organizational relationships but also extended extra-organizational relationship networks (e.g., clan structures) may shift the moral locus of accountability from serving the public interest of citizens and society at large toward serving peers and rewarding loyalty, thus increasing systematic nepotism and patronage (Campbell 2020;Oliveros 2016;Suhardiman and Mollinga 2017;Sundström 2019;Nkyabonaki 2019;Kumasey and Hossain 2020). This is why nepotism reduces agents' willingness to peer-monitor, a necessary condition curbing black corruption (Odilla 2020).…”

The Impact of the EU IUU Regulation on the Sustainability of the Thai Fishing Industry

“…This improvement was attainable as the Thai government has pursued good governance, sympathizing with the EU's concern on the sustainability of fisheries. If there has been an issue of corruption in fisheries regulation, as in the South African fisheries sector, where bribery is being ramped, no fundamental reform would have been possible [42]. To guarantee the government's efforts transparent and effective, there also needs to be a watchdog system preventing any corruption and loss of trust.…”

“…To guarantee the government's efforts transparent and effective, there also needs to be a watchdog system preventing any corruption and loss of trust. 'Sustainable' good governance is also an important element to achieve [42,43] what the IUU Regulation has aimed.…”

Incentive-based Social Welfare Administration in Indonesia: Implications for sustainable development in women’s and children’s protection

“…Incentive-based payments to civil servants, including social workers, are argued to encourage greater productivity and programme success (Banuri and Keefer, 2015; Koike, 2013). Internationally, authors (De Ree et al, 2015; Sundström, 2017) propose that financial incentives for honest efforts can orient individuals away from poor administrative practice.…”