Exploring the conjunction fallacy within a category learning framework

Abstract

The literature presents two major theories on the cause of the conjunction fallacy. The first attributes the conjunction fallacy to the representativeness heuristic. The second suggests that the conjunction fallacy is caused by people combining p(A) and p(B) into p(A&B) in an inappropriate manner. These two theories were contrasted in two category-learning experiments. As predicted by the latter theory, data showed that participants that could assess p(A&B) directly made fewer conjunction fallacies than participants who had to compute p(A) and p(B) separately and then combine them into p(A&B). Least conjunction fallacies were observed in the cases where the representativeness heuristic was applicable. Overall, data showed that an inability to appropriately combine probabilities is one of the key cognitive mechanisms behind the conjunction fallacy.

Is there something special with probabilities? – Insight vs. computational ability in multiple risk combination

“…Indeed, even classic judgment biases, like the conjunction fallacy and base-rate neglect (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), may not primarily be explained by use of a specific heuristic per se, like ''representativeness'', as typically claimed (although people no doubt sometimes use similarity or representativeness to make these judgments), but by a tendency to combine constituent probabilities by linear additive combination. Accordingly, the rate of conjunction errors appears equally high regardless of whether the representativeness heuristic is applicable or not (Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991;Nilsson, 2008 Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, previous research is not conclusive in regard to whether people have spontaneous appreciation for the reasoning rules specific to probability or if they treat tasks with probability contents just as any other task. One possibility is that extensive experience with the processing of an uncertain environment (in the species or the individual) has ''geared'' into the mind the rules of reasoning that are specific to uncertainty.…”

The Bayesian logic of frequency-based conjunction fallacies

“…Furthermore, the task is concerned neither with contingency assessment in general nor with the strength of correlations (Hattori & Oaksford, 2007;Kao & Wassermann, 1993;McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2007;White, 2002) or causal links (Cheng, 1997;Hagmayer, Sloman, Lagnado, & Waldmann, 2007;Oberauer, Weidenfeld, & Fischer, 2007;Waldmann, 2007). The task seems in fact to be most closely related to the intense debate on probability judgments concerning logically nested hypotheses and so-called ''conjunction fallacies'' (e.g., Crupi, Fitelson, & Tentori, 2008;Fisk & Slattery, 2005;Gigerenzer, 1994Gigerenzer, , 1996Hertwig, Benz, & Krauss, 2008;Hintikka, 2004;Kahneman & Frederick, 2005;Lagnado & Shanks, 2002;Neace, Michaud, Bolling, Deer, & Zecevic, 2008;Nilsson, 2008;Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002;Sloman, Over, Slovak, & Stibel, 2003;Tversky & Kahneman, 1983;Wedell & Moro, 2008). This paper in fact expounds and tests a model of a specific kind of conjunction fallacy based on frequency information in a 2 × 2 contingency table.…”

The rational status of quantum cognition.

“…In QPT terms, 'direct' computation would be more likely to reflect the concurrent evaluation of questions, which is a characteristic of compatible questions. Nilsson et al (2008) also reported that increased familiarity, which is thought to make compatible representations more likely (cf. Trueblood & Pothos, 2014), reduced the rate of CEs.…”