2012 Fourth International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS 2012) 2012
DOI: 10.1109/comsnets.2012.6151333
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Exploring the design space of social network-based Sybil defenses

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Cited by 41 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…In another study, Yu provided a concise summary of existing Sybil defenses and described their working principles under the classical scenario [15]. Viswanath et al further explored the design space for OSN-based defenses [16], and Boshmaf et al presented a framework for the evaluation of graph-based Sybil detection [17]. Our work is substantially different from such studies: First, we analyze the performance of Sybil defenses in a completely new scenario, i.e., the modern scenario (Sec.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In another study, Yu provided a concise summary of existing Sybil defenses and described their working principles under the classical scenario [15]. Viswanath et al further explored the design space for OSN-based defenses [16], and Boshmaf et al presented a framework for the evaluation of graph-based Sybil detection [17]. Our work is substantially different from such studies: First, we analyze the performance of Sybil defenses in a completely new scenario, i.e., the modern scenario (Sec.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, there are effective solutions such as [38], [39] to detecting Sybil accounts in distributed systems under the control of a single attacker. These solutions commonly assume that the link between two accounts corresponds to a real social relationship difficult to establish and impossible to forge.…”
Section: ) Impact Of Different Actions On Twittermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The regular adversary α r has a complete control over the Sybil region S, but cannot establish more than O(n/T ( )) attack edges, where T ( ) is the mixing time of the Markov chain over G N . This bound is typically assumed in GSD algorithms [11], [12], as one expects the adversary to require non-trivial social engineering capabilities in order to establish many attack edges. The social adversary α s , however, is more resourceful and has the same capabilities of α r but can establish arbitrarily large number of attack edges, which is motivated by recent empirical results in online social networks [4], [30].…”
Section: B Adversary Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Given a graph G of a system, state-of-the-art Graph-based Sybil Detection (GSD) algorithms operate on G by making the following assumptions [11], [12]: First, the system owner knows at least one honest identity in G. Second, the adversary cannot establish arbitrarily many relationships between Sybil and honest identities. Third, the subgraph induced by the set of honest identities is fast mixing.…”
Section: B Graph-based Sybil Detectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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