Exploring the formal and informal roles of regulatory intermediaries in transnational multistakeholder regulation

Abstract

Research on regulation and regulatory processes has traditionally focused on two prominent roles: rulemaking and rule‐taking. Recently, the mediating role of third party actors, regulatory intermediaries, has started to be explored – notably in a dedicated special issue of the ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The present special issue extends this line of research by elaborating the distinction between formal and informal modes of regulatory intermediation, in the specific context of transnational multistakeholder regulation. In this introduction, we identify two key dimensions of intermediation (in)formalism: officialization and formalization. This allows us to develop a typology of intermediation in multistakeholder regulatory processes: formal, interpretive, alternative, and emergent. Leveraging examples from the papers in this special issue, we discuss how these four types of intermediation coexist and evolve over time. Finally, we elaborate on the implications of our typology for regulatory processes and outcomes.

Big audit firms as regulatory intermediaries in transnational labor governance

“…First, while acknowledging the suitability of Abbot et al .’s (2017) RIT model, we show, in line with the Special Issue's introductory paper (Brès et al . , forthcoming), that the Big Four's influencing practices as for‐profit regulatory intermediaries are highly varied and include many unformalized and unofficial channels of influence. Cross‐fertilization with the lobbying literature in particular helps us unearth how through different roles the Big Four can shape regulation as intermediaries in different ways.…”

“…Second, we find that particularly when intermediaries seek to influence regulation through “unofficial” and “non‐formal” channels emphasized in this Special Issue (see Brès et al . , forthcoming), their political behavior is more varied and extensive than the current literature posits. Indeed, we hold that many of the ways in which actors involved in intermediary roles seek to secure their position lie outside of the roles assigned to them as intermediaries in regulatory governance (cf.…”

“…In line with the conceptualization suggested in the Introduction to this Special Issue (Brès et al . , forthcoming), we identify significant informal political behavior of intermediary organizations, both in terms of unofficial and unformalized practices. Unofficial behavior includes covert lobbying toward rule‐takers by intermediaries.…”

“…Brès et al . , forthcoming). Audit firms seek to influence governmental regulators, private regulators, firms, and stakeholder groups in various stages of the private regulatory policy process.…”

Intermediary roles in regulatory programs: Toward a role‐based framework

“…a,b; Brès et al . ). However, we still have a rather limited understanding of the types of organizations that become regulatory intermediaries, the activities that they perform, their dynamic interaction with other organizations, and what makes them successful.…”