Exploring the implications of ‘low visibility’ specialist cyber-crime units

Abstract

Using original data gathered within Australia, this paper argues that specialist cyber-policing units experience a pronounced level of low visibility within the police. This low visibility has three key dimensions. Firstly, there is low ‘vertical’ visibility as higher management and supervisors often have a limited understanding of the nature of the work and the needs of these units. Secondly, there is low ‘horizontal’ visibility as peers and colleagues within the wider organisation are similarly lacking in terms of their understanding of cyber-policing. The third dimension of low visibility concerns the external–internal visibility of the units as they relate to outside stakeholders including politics, media, the wider community and the judiciary. It is argued there is also a significant level of disinterest, disengagement and ignorance along this external–internal dimension. The implications of this ‘low visibility’ is explored and it is argued that there are consequences for the effectiveness of the units while also raising concerns around accountability and the overall prospects for progressive change.

The theory and evidence behind law enforcement strategies that combat child sexual abuse material

“…Nonetheless, common considerations could be equipment, training and personnel. It is important that the 'visibility' of these units is raised to promote awareness of these crimes (within the police force and among the public), increasing the units' profile and implications, including resourcing and capacity (Harkin and Whelan, 2019). It is important that law enforcement continues to identify ways to connect with the technology division for training and to capitalize their resources to combat these crimes (Holt et al, 2020).…”

Police preparedness to respond to cybercrime in Australia: An analysis of individual and organizational capabilities

“…For example, the Queensland Police Service (QPS) has the Financial and Cyber Crime Group (for investigating general cybercrime offenses) and Taskforce Argos (for investigating online child exploitation and abuse). Relatedly, device forensics for storage media is limited to officers that have been trained and authorized by the Electronic Evidence Unit (QPS, 2019b, p. 70). Similarly, the Western Australian Police Force has Technology Crime Services , which is subdivided into three specialized teams focusing on cybercrime investigations, digital evidence, and online monitoring.…”

Understanding the Expertise Required by Law Enforcement Investigating Cybercrime: An Exploration of Social Engineering Techniques

“…Minimal research exists on how law enforcement conducts covert investigations online. As such, like other studies that have sought to develop an initial understanding of cybercrime investigation(Harkin & Whelan, 2019;O'Leary & D'Ovidio, 2007;Tetzlaff-Bemiller, 2011), understanding the work from the perspective of law enforcement is a critical first step. This study aims to develop the evidence-base on what skills are needed to investigate cybercrime in covert operations.…”

“…for investigators of cybercrime, particularly those who primarily utilise covert investigative tactics. Firstly, accessing high-quality or standardised training is very difficult.has not yet been conducted in order to improve upon procedures and increase the likelihood of successful prosecution.Further challenges for training are present due to the low-visibility of the covert teams(Harkin & Whelan, 2019). Based on pre-gathered anonymous survey data with 66 specialist cybercrime investigators in Australia,Harkin and Whelan (2019) were able to identify that training and skill retention was a problem among specialist units, and this was reported by participants to be due to the low visibility of the units.…”

“…Firstly, accessing high-quality or standardised training is very difficult.has not yet been conducted in order to improve upon procedures and increase the likelihood of successful prosecution.Further challenges for training are present due to the low-visibility of the covert teams(Harkin & Whelan, 2019). Based on pre-gathered anonymous survey data with 66 specialist cybercrime investigators in Australia,Harkin and Whelan (2019) were able to identify that training and skill retention was a problem among specialist units, and this was reported by participants to be due to the low visibility of the units. Thus, it may be that not only is specialized training required by investigators, but a more significant shift towards transparency and understanding by senior managers and the policing community is also required.…”