Expressive Law and Economics

Abstract

Abstract:This article develops an economic theory of expressive law. By expressing social values, law can tip a system of social norms into a new equilibrium. This process can create or destroy a social norm without changing individual values. In addition, law can change the individual values of rational people. Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that attaches a psychological penalty to a forbidden act. A rational person internalizes a norm when commitment conveys an advantage relative to the original preferences and the changed preferences.

Changes in divorce patterns: Culture and the law

“…Another strand of the literature considers that individuals are able to change their preferences when it is in their self-interest to do so (if the material payoff associated with alternative preferences is large). Then, a change in the law, by altering the relative payoff associated with each cultural trait, may generate an evolution of preferences through this internalization channel (see Cooter, 1998Cooter, , 2000. Under this alternative specification, the adoption of the unilateral divorce will generate the spread of more tolerant attitudes toward divorce, as is the case in our model.…”

Law and Economics: Empirical Dimensions

“…If one relaxes the neoclassical assumption that preferences are exogenous to the model, and instead assumes that criminal law is intended to discourage preferences for criminal behavior, as well as to raise the costs of engaging in such behavior, then one can explain many of the fundamental doctrines of criminal law. Further work on how the law shapes preferences or helps establish new norms -sometime referred to as the 'expressive function of law' -has been done by Cooter (1998) and Sunstein (1996); and empirical testing of the expressive function of law is found in Feldman (2009) (suggesting based on field experiments that the expressive impact of trade secret laws operates primarily through their impact on morality), Funk (2007) (laws removing the obligation to vote led to significantly lower levels of voter turnout in Switzerland, even though the former voting requirement was only symbolic and never enforced by fine), and Wittlin (2011) (finding that seat belt laws increase seat belt usage independent of enforcement). This work lends itself naturally to integration with work from sociology, because it raises questions concerning how law impacts socialization and how law shapes both norms and individual preferences.…”

Problematic legal pluralism: causes and some potential ‘cures’

“…22 When analysts do acknowledge that norms can differ from the state law, the omnipotence of the state is often assumed. For instance, Cooter (1998), Dharmapala and McAdams (2003), Geisinger (2002), and Funk (2005) all emphasise the social engineering capacity of the state (often termed as the expressive or communicative function of law). It is often assumed that the state is able to create and perpetuate norms through the communicative role of the law in changing internalised beliefs within society.…”