Extended Consciousness and Predictive Processing

Kirchhoff, Michael D.; Kiverstein, Julian

doi:10.4324/9781315150420

Cited by 102 publications

(109 citation statements)

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“…Understanding object and tool embodiment in terms of the activity of a cognitive system extending beyond the brain and the body and integrating those objects and tools into that activity, is a common feature within some radical proposals in the embodied approach to cognition. The strongest forms of the hypothesis of the extended mind (Menary, 2010;Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, 2019) and those approaches based on ecological psychology, enactivism, and dynamic systems share this form of radical embodiment. In both cases, the signatures of the embodiment of objects and tools are not taken to be a matter of body representations, but a matter of coupling between the different components of the system (e.g., the body + prothesis, the body + a tool, and so on; see, e.g., Van Orden et al, 2005;Dotov et al, 2010).…”

Section: The Cognitive Science Of Embodiment: Two Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We use the umbrella term of radical embodiment to refer to a group of theories of perception, action, and cognition inspired in phenomenology (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007;Käufer and Chemero, 2015), ecological psychology (Gibson, 1966(Gibson, , 1979Michaels and Carello, 1981;Richardson et al, 2008;Chemero, 2009;Turvey, 2019), and enactivism (Varela et al, 1991;Hutto and Myin, 2013;Di Paolo et al, 2017), as well as to some radical proposals that follow from the hypothesis of the extended mind (Menary, 2010;Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, 2019). Although we are well aware that there are more or less important differences between all these approaches (Walter, 2010a,b), we are not going to take issue with them as, for the sake of our study, their similarities overrule their differences.…”

Section: A Primer On Radical Embodimentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Embodiment of Objects: Review, Analysis, and Future Directions

2019

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Here we offer a thorough review of the empirical literature on the conditions under which an object, such as a tool or a prosthetic (whether real or virtual), can be experienced as being in some sense a part or extension of one's body. We discuss this literature both from the standpoint of the apparent malleability of our body representations, and also from within the framework of radical embodied cognition, which understands the phenomenon to result not from an alteration to a representation, but rather from the achievement of a certain kind of sensory/motor coupling. We highlight both the tensions between these frameworks, and also areas where they can productively complement one another for future research.

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Section: The Cognitive Science Of Embodiment: Two Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Primer On Radical Embodimentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Embodiment of Objects: Review, Analysis, and Future Directions

2019

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“…In this sense, the Markov blanket is best understood as a boundary (Schrödinger 1943). Markov blanket boundaries can be found at many different scales of life, from macromolecules to organelles, organs and humans (Clark 2017;Hipólito 2019;Kirchhoff et al 2018;Kirchhoff & Kiverstein 2019;Palacios et al 2017;Ramstead et al 2017). A key aspect of a Markov blanket is that it yields a formal way by which to define what it means for internal and external states to be conditionally independent of one another given a third set of states: active and sensory states.…”

Section: The Markov Blanket Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Illustration of the partitioning rule governing Markov blankets (Kirchhoff & Kiverstein, 2019) This figure highlights the conditional independencies induced by the presence of a Markov blanket. On the one hand, external states, E, cause sensory states, S, which influence, but are not also influenced by, internal states, I.…”

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

The Predictive Brain: A Modular View of Brain and Cognitive Function?

Hipólito¹,

Kirchhoff²

2019

Preprint

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Modularity is arguably one of the most influential theses guiding research on brain and cognitive function since phrenology. This paper considers the following question: is modularity entailed by recent Bayesian models of brain and cognitive function, especially the predictive processing framework? It starts by considering three of the most well-articulated arguments for the view that modularity and predictive processing work well together. It argues that all three kinds of arguments for modularity come up short, albeit for different reasons. The analysis in this paper, although formulated in the context of predictive processing, speaks to broader issues with how to understand the relationship between functional segregation and integration and the reciprocal architecture of the predictive brain. These conclusions have implications for how to study brain and cognitive function. Specifically, when cognitive neuroscience works within an acyclic Markov decision scheme, adopted by most Bayesian models of brain and cognitive function, it may very well be methodologically misguided. This speaks to an increasing tendency within the cognitive neurosciences to emphasise recurrent and reciprocal neuronal processing captured within newly emerging dynamical causal modelling frameworks. The conclusions also suggest that functional integration is an organising principle of brain and cognitive function.

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“…Aesthetic applications of enactivist principles in extended accounts of music is another area of recent development (Krueger ; Matyja and Schiavio ; Schiavio and Menin ), as is an explanation of memory that involves both extended and socially “inter(en)active” processes (Colombetti and Torrance 2009; see Wilson ; Sutton et al ; Michaelian and Sutton ). Finally, consciousness, although a more contentious topic of investigation (see, e.g., Clark ; ), has recently been addressed by theorists who are riding the third‐wave (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, inpress; Ward )…”

Section: Surfing the Gnarlatious Tsunamimentioning

confidence: 99%

The Extended Mind: State of the Question

Gallagher¹

2018

The Southern J of Philosophy

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It has been twenty years since Clark and Chalmers published “The Extended Mind.” In the present article I review the development of the extended mind hypothesis across what some proponents have defined as three theoretical “waves.” From first‐wave extended mind theory, based on the parity principle, to second‐wave complementarity, to the third wave, characterized as an uneasy integration of predictive processing and enactivist dynamics, extended mind theorists have faced and solved a number of problems along the way. The fact that the hypothesis continues to spark debate and to generate both new insights and new objections suggests that it continues to play a productive role in contemporary philosophy of mind.

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Extended Consciousness and Predictive Processing

Cited by 102 publications

References 0 publications

The Embodiment of Objects: Review, Analysis, and Future Directions

The Embodiment of Objects: Review, Analysis, and Future Directions

The Predictive Brain: A Modular View of Brain and Cognitive Function?

The Extended Mind: State of the Question

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