In this paper, we investigate a class of mean field games where the mean field interactions are achieved through the joint (conditional) distribution of the controlled state and the control process. The strategies are of open loop type, and the volatility coefficient σ can be controlled. Using (controlled) Fokker-Planck equations, we introduce a notion of measure-valued solution of mean-field games of controls, and through convergence results, prove a relation between these solutions on the one hand, and the ǫN -Nash equilibria on the other hand. It is shown that ǫN -Nash equilibria in the N -player games have limits as N tends to infinity, and each limit is a measure-valued solution of the mean-field games of controls. Conversely, any measure-valued solution can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of ǫN -Nash equilibria in the N -player games. In other words, the measure-valued solutions are the accumulating points of ǫN -Nash equilibria. Similarly, by considering an ǫ-strong solution of mean field games of controls which is the classical strong solution where the optimality is obtained by admitting a small error ǫ, we prove that the measure-valued solutions are the accumulating points of this type of solutions when ǫ goes to zero. Finally, existence of measure-valued solution of mean-field games of controls are proved in the case without common noise. * The author is grateful to Dylan Possamaï and Xiaolu Tan for helpful comments and suggestions.