Extending Helios Towards Private Eligibility Verifiability

Kulyk, Oksana; Teague, Vanessa; Volkamer, Melanie

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-22270-7_4

Cited by 28 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…This happens to hold for both the schemes [11] and [22] discussed above. For the uncoerced voter this alternative scheme will be just like standard Selene.…”

Section: Selene IImentioning

confidence: 81%

“…Some degree of coercion resistance can be obtained by combining BeleniosRF [11] with vote updating. Another possibility for partial coercion resistance is to use the scheme by Kulyk, Teague and Volkamer [22] where each voter can cast several vote values and only the sum of these will count in the end. The total number of votes are hidden in a cloud of null votes which any participant can cast for the voter.…”

Section: Coercion: Threats and Mitigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The voting authority knows the true credential, and the voter can provide the coercer(s) with fake credential(s). Where Civitas is not directly compatible with Selene, one can imagine to combine its credential construction and the extra null votes of [22] to create a true coercion-resistant scheme compatible with the tracker construction. In this case the extra credentials can also be used to make the tracker retrieval coercion-resistant.…”

Section: Coercion: Threats and Mitigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Selene: Voting with Transparent Verifiability and Coercion-Mitigation

Ryan

Rønne

Iovino

2016

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. End-to-end verifiable voting schemes typically involves voters handling an encrypted ballot in order to confirm that their vote is accurately included in the tally. While this may be technically valid, from a public acceptance standpoint is may be problematic: many voters may not really understand the purpose of the encrypted ballot and the various checks that they can perform. In this paper we take a different approach and revisit an old idea: to provide each voter with a private tracking number. Votes are posted on a bulletin board in the clear along with their associated tracking number. This is appealing in that it provides voters with a very simple, intuitive way to verify their vote, in the clear. However, there are obvious drawbacks: we must ensure that no two voters are assigned the same tracker and we need to keep the trackers private. In this paper, we propose a scheme that addresses both of these problems: we ensure that voters get unique trackers and we close off the coercer's window of opportunity by ensuring that the voters only learn their tracking numbers after votes have been posted. The resulting scheme provides receipt-freeness, and indeed a good level of coercion-resistance while also providesinga more immediately understandable form of verifiability. The cryptographyis under the bonnet as far as the voter is concerned. The basic scheme still has a problem in some contexts: if the coercer is himself a voter there is a chance that the coerced voter might light on the coercer's tracker, or the coercer simply claims that it is his. We argue that in many contexts this may be an acceptable threat when weighed against the more transparent verification provided by the scheme. Nonetheless, we describe some elaborations of the basic scheme to mitigate such threats.

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“…This happens to hold for both the schemes [11] and [22] discussed above. For the uncoerced voter this alternative scheme will be just like standard Selene.…”

Section: Selene IImentioning

confidence: 81%

Section: Coercion: Threats and Mitigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Coercion: Threats and Mitigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Selene: Voting with Transparent Verifiability and Coercion-Mitigation

Ryan

Rønne

Iovino

2016

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…A further modification [11] introduces distributed tallying via Pedersen secret sharing. The BeleniosRF protocol [26], as well as the protocol by Kulyk et al [27], [28] introduce receipt freeness into Helios, while the latter protocol also ensures eligibility verifiability with hiding the information on whether a particular eligible voter participated in the election or abstained. The extension ensuring long term privacy in Helios was proposed by Demirel et al [29].…”

Section: A Helios Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introducing Proxy Voting to Helios

Kulyk

Marky

Neumann

et al. 2016

2016 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)

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“…Our contribution is addressing these weaknesses and proposing an Internet voting scheme for proxy voting that ensures participation privacy and receipt-freeness. In particular, we use the idea of dummy ballots introduced in the Helios extension that has been proposed in [7] and its security proven in [8,9]. Our extension ensures participation privacy by hiding the information, whether a given eligible voter participated in the election, cast her ballot directly or delegated to some proxy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Proxy Voting Scheme Ensuring Participation Privacy and Receipt-Freeness

Kulyk¹,

Volkamer²

2019

Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences

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Proxy voting is a form of voting meant to support the voters who want to delegate their voting right to a trusted entity, the so-called proxy. Depending on the form of proxy voting, the proxy is either authorized to cast a ballot for the voting option that the voter chooses, or to vote according to her own wishes, if the voter is not sure how to vote and wants to delegate the decision making in the election. While the first form of proxy voting has been applied to traditional elections in order to support the voters who are unable to physically get to a polling station, the second form has been a topic of research in Internet voting. Recently, an Internet voting scheme has been proposed, that extends the well-known Helios scheme towards the functionality of proxy voting. This scheme, however, also has the drawbacks of Helios regarding participation privacy and receipt-freeness. As such, the information whether any voter participated in the election either by casting a direct vote or delegating their vote can be deduced from the published information. The scheme furthermore allows both the voters and the proxies to create receipts that prove casting a ballot for a specific candidate, as well as allows the voters to create receipts that prove delegating to a specific proxy. In this work we use the idea of dummy ballots, proposed in another extension of Helios to extend the proxy voting scheme towards participation privacy and receipt-freeness.

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Extending Helios Towards Private Eligibility Verifiability

Cited by 28 publications

References 32 publications

Selene: Voting with Transparent Verifiability and Coercion-Mitigation

Selene: Voting with Transparent Verifiability and Coercion-Mitigation

Introducing Proxy Voting to Helios

A Proxy Voting Scheme Ensuring Participation Privacy and Receipt-Freeness

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