External Actors, State‐Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction

Abstract

This article introduces the themes and arguments of the special issue. While virtually all polities enjoy uncontested international legal sovereignty, there are wide variations in statehood, that is, the monopoly over the means of violence and the ability of the state to make and implement policies. Areas of limited statehood are not, however, ungoverned spaces where anarchy and chaos prevail. The provision of collective goods and services is possible even under extremely adverse conditions of fragile or failed statehood. We specify the conditions under which external efforts at state-building and service provision by state and nonstate actors can achieve their goals. We focus on the extent to which external actors enhance the capacity (statehood) of authority structures in weak states, or directly contribute to the provision of collective goods and services, such as public health, clean environment, social security, and infrastructure. We argue that three factors determine success: legitimacy, task complexity, and institutionalization, including the provision of adequate resources.This special issue begins with the empirical observation that the idealtypical conception of a consolidated state is misleading rather than illuminating. A consolidated state enjoys the privileges of international legal sovereignty, including recognition, the right to enter into treaties, and to join international organizations. It is a full "Westphalian/Vattelian" sovereign: Domestic authority structures are autonomously determined. It exercises effective domestic sovereignty, what we term here statehood, that is, the monopoly over the legitimate use of force and the ability to successfully make, implement, and enforce rules and regulations across all policy arenas within its territory (Krasner 1999;Risse 2011).This ideal typical construct is far removed from the situation that exists in most of the world's polities. Most relevant for this special issue, there are wide variations in statehood. These variations are here to stay and it makes little sense to orient external efforts at capacity-building and service provision toward an ideal of consolidated statehood that only exists in some parts of the world.

The noble west and the dirty rest? Western democracy promoters and illiberal regional powers

“…66 Finally, Western actors require legitimacy to promote democratic change. 67 EU and US democratic demands meet with public resentment whenever they clash with nationalist or religious beliefs, for example regarding the role of minorities, or are perceived as attempting to control the country. Domestic conditions severely limit the effectiveness of Western democracy promotion.…”

Private Military and Security Companies policy in Africa: Regional policy stasis as Agency in international politics

“…This article ties PMSC activity to the concept of limited statehood because "most states are neither consolidated nor failed". 26 The role of PMSCs tends to fill the vacuum in the ability of some African states to provide security to its citizens. In the cases of Angola and Sierra Leone, the armies under legitimate governments did not have complete control over their territory.…”

EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring

“…Statehood describes the 'strength' of a state beyond its formal recognition by the international community. Consolidated statehood is understood here, first, as the regime's effective monopoly on the legitimate use of force and, second, its capacity to implement and enforce collectively binding decisions, that is to govern effectively (Krasner and Risse 2014;Risse 2011). Statehood can be limited in either dimension, constraining the regime's ability to govern its territory in general, or regarding specific policies or social groups.…”

“…Next to the monopoly on the use of force, the degree of statehood crucially depends on a state's capacity to make, implement, and enforce decisions (Krasner and Risse 2014;Risse 2011). Again, the line between measures of the sheer capacity for governance, and indicators for the actual provision of collective goods and services, is often blurred in indices that try to capture the quality of states and public policies.…”