External Territorial Threats and Military Regimes

Kim, Nam Kyu

doi:10.1177/1065912918812743

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 53 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These characteristics are not applicable to personalist military rule (see also Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018, 211-14). Kim (2019) also demonstrates that the determinants of the two military dictatorships are different from each other. However, these studies do not explore the impacts of the two types of military dictatorships on the likelihood of democratic survival and consolidation in the fledgling democracies.…”

Section: Two Types Of Military Rulementioning

confidence: 96%

Previous Military Rule and Democratic Survival

Kim

2020

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Existing scholarship shows that a history of military rule increases the risk of democratic breakdown. However, scholars overlook the fact that military rule takes two distinct forms: collegial and personalist military rule. I argue that the two types of military rule provide different structural settings for post-authoritarian contexts. Collegial military rule hands over more cohesive and hierarchical militaries to their subsequent democracies than personalist military rule. These militaries remain organized, politicized, and powerful in emerging democracies, which increases the risk of military intervention and coups. I hypothesize that collegial military rule poses a greater threat to the survival of the ensuing democracies than personalist military rule. Empirical analysis reveals that democracies after collegial military rule are more likely to collapse than other democracies, including those emerging from personalist military rule. This shows that the previous finding on the detrimental effect of military rule is largely driven by collegial military rule.

show abstract

Section: Two Types Of Military Rulementioning

confidence: 96%

Previous Military Rule and Democratic Survival

Kim

2020

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…2018; Timoneda 2020). As for regime types, scholars have mostly focused on the emergence of military rule and the impact of internal and external conflict (Eibl, Hertog, and Slater 2021;Kim 2019).…”

Section: Extant Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The existence of institutions is often assumed to signify the presence of effective constraints to the dictator's power, although they are, in fact, compatible (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Timoneda 2020). As for regime types, scholars have mostly focused on the emergence of military rule and the impact of internal and external conflict (Eibl, Hertog, and Slater 2021; Kim 2019).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rush to Personalize: Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships

Timoneda

Escribà‐Folch

Chin

2023

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How do failed coups influence power personalization in dictatorships? While scholars have studied the mechanisms of personalism in dictatorships in detail, little attention has been paid to the timing and determinants of surges in personalism levels. In this article, we propose that personalism can evolve non-linearly, and show that large, quite rapid increases in personalization by dictators occur after a failed coup attempt. The logic is that failed coups are information-revealing events that provide the dictator with strong motives and ample opportunities to accumulate power. The leader uses this window of opportunity to rapidly consolidate his power at the expense of the ruling coalition. We test the theory using time-series, cross-sectional data on dictatorships in 114 countries in the period between 1946 and 2010. Two placebo tests indicate that disruptive events by regime outsiders – failed assassination attempts and civil war onsets – do not promote the rush to personalize.

show abstract

“…As national security becomes a top political agenda, and countries invest in war preparedness, the military develops into not just a politically but also a socially powerful force. Kim (2019) shows that sustained threats to homeland territory create an environment conducive to the presence of military regimes. Furthermore, a political culture of militarism often reproduces over decades.…”

Section: How International Security Environments Influence Individual Gender Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

External threat environments and individual bias against female leaders

Kim

Kang

2021

PSRM

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We argue that a country's international security context influences individual bias against female leaders and propose three mechanisms: by increasing individual demand for defense, by shaping individual ideological orientations, and by increasing society's level of militarization. Using survey data of more than 200,000 individuals in 84 countries, we show the more hostile the country's security environment, the more individuals are likely to agree that men make better political leaders than do women. We also find support for some of our proposed mechanisms and that the effect of security environments is greater for men than women. Our study presents the first cross-national evidence that the country's international security environment correlates with bias against women leaders.

show abstract

External Territorial Threats and Military Regimes

Cited by 9 publications

References 53 publications

Previous Military Rule and Democratic Survival

Previous Military Rule and Democratic Survival

The Rush to Personalize: Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships

External threat environments and individual bias against female leaders

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About