Extractive Industries and African Democracy: Can the “Resource Curse” be Exorcised?

Abstract

By the well‐known “resource curse,” the abundance of oil and other valuable minerals has been associated with patrimonialism and repression—in Africa and elsewhere. This article demonstrates a self‐sustaining dynamic: lack of accountability enables elite appropriation of resources which in turn raises the monetary value of political control and finances continued repression. Several initiatives have been taken in recent years to foster transparency in mineral production and revenue, but with marginal impact. Lifting the curse requires a robust global effort to discourage “plunder oil.” This is unlikely as long as the benefits of cheap oil to the importing countries outweigh the costs to the population of the exporting countries. The oil addiction of developed and emerging economies remains an oil malediction for African democracy. But launching a sustained international debate could eventually bear fruit.

The role of country-level institutional factors in escaping the natural resource curse: Insights from Ghana

“…Since oil discovery and exports have positively impacted upon developed countries (Larsen, 2006), one would naturally conclude that petroleum discovery in developing countries particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (Yates, 2006), would be similarly advantageous to those economies. However, the likelihood that petroleum discovery in developing countries would be a blessing rather than a curse is an issue that is regularly debated within the energy sector literature and amongst policy makers (Ablo, 2015).The widely researched issue on the 'natural resourcecurse' hypothesis (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003;Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004;Kopiński et al, 2013;Satti et al, 2014) also called 'the paradox of plenty' (Karl, 1997) assumes that developing countries that are rich in natural resources (Mikesell, 1997) are susceptible to petroleum revenue mismanagement, poor governance (Watts, 2004), rent-seeking behavior (Kopiński et al, 2013), corruption (Roberts, 2015), socio-economic and political crisis and conflicts (Le Billon, 2006) that can weaken democratic processes (McFerson, 2010), stability, growth and development (Robinson et al, 2006;Mehlum et al, 2006). This phenomenon is hypothesised that resource-rich developing countries tend to grow more slowly than their less resourced counterparts (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001Humphreys et al, 2007).…”

The extractive industries and development: The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels

“…Mineral rents are often misused by authoritarian rulers for the purpose of prolonging their stay in power (see Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013;Cuaresma et al, 2010). For example, authoritarian regimes in mineralrich states can rely much more on mineral rents than tax revenues, which correspondingly reduces public demand for democratic accountability (McFerson, 2010;Ross, 2001Ross, , 2009; see also the book by Jill Crystal (1990) on oil politics in Kuwait and Qatar). Spending on patronage fuelled by the abundance of mineral rents may have a similar effect (Auty, 2005;Vandewalle, 1998).…”

Securitization outside of the West: conceptualizing the securitization–neo-patrimonialism nexus in Africa

“…Where a state is lacking in natural resources or the price slumps, the 'hand-out' -aid, loans and grants from foreign donor patrons -become a 'pull factor' towards a competition to control the state power in order to be in control of such funds. In both cases, the contracts, the mining licenses, oil blocks, and choice appointments are handed out to the patron's faithful 'servants' 'friends' (local and foreign), family members or people from his ethnic group (see McFerson, 2010;342-344) and for Chabal and Daloz (1999;81-87) that is the way Africa works. For Richards (1996;xviii),the Sierra Leone war as well as the ones in Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Congo DR, Cote d'Ivoire, and the restiveness in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, are all 'a product of this protracted, post-colonial crisis of patrimonialism'.…”

“…Let it be quickly reiterated that like traditional patrimonialism, the 'neo' version is not in any way restricted to post-colonial states of Africa. Taylor (2010;3) and McFerson, (2010;343) have noted that it can also be identified in other places such as Ukraine, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Myanmar, Indonesia, Russia and various Latin American nations (see also, Lemarchand and Eisenstadt,1980;Clapham, 1982;Fattom,2002).…”