This paper explores the 1895 libel trial between Oscar Wilde (literary personality) and the Marquis of Queensbury (father of Wilde's close friend).Focussing on the lead defence counsel's cross-examination of Wilde (plaintiff), I demonstrate that Carson's FTAs are "aggressive" and, in some cases, "deliberately" so (cf. Bousfield 2008: 72). However, as they do not breach the rules of the courtroom or involve an overt "intent to harm" (Goffman 1967: 14), I argue that they do not constitute impoliteness. I further argue that Carson's FTAs should not be considered "incidental" in nature, given they were more planned and more anticipated than Goffman's (1967: 14) definition seems to allow, and thus suggest that Carson's FTAs be recognized as sitting somewhere between Goffman's intentional or incidental levels Ϫ thanks, in part, to their manipulation of multiple goals (Penman 1990
) Ϫ in what I have labelled the ambiguous-as-to-speakerintent zone (Archer under review). I also demonstrate Carson's use/manipulation of representational frames and reality paradigms so as to emphasizeWilde's moral "deviance". In brief, a reality paradigm equates to "the systems of beliefs [and] values … by reference to which a person or a society comprehends the world" (Fowler 1986: 130), and representational frames, to the way(s) in which interlocutors opt to "represent the character traits, ideas and opinions of and even statements made by others" (Locher and Watts 2008: 99, n9