Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

Chalmers, David J.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0001

Cited by 589 publications

(785 citation statements)

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“…An important limitation is that Bunge's emergent materialism stays strictly within the material dimension, and has nothing to say about what Chalmers (1995) calls Bthe hard problem of consciousness^. This is seen, for example, in Bunge's way of formulating empirically testable hypotheses derived from his theory in functional terms.…”

Section: Functions Not Experiencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Chalmers (1995), however, argues that consciousness is an ambiguous term, which covers a number of different problems, of which some are Beasier^and others are more difficult. If by Bconsciousness^we merely mean merely the ability to report about one's inner mental states, it would be possible to define it in terms of a mechanism that performs this function, and would therefore fit neatly into Bunge's emergentism.…”

Section: Functions Not Experiencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Generalizing from Case Studies: A Commentary

Saint-Georges

2017

Integr. psych. behav.

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The present paper outlines the nature of a three-dimensional ontology and the place of psychological science within this ontology, in a way that is partly similar to and partly different from that of Pérez-Álvarez. The first dimension is the material realities, and involves different levels (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.), where each level builds on a lower level but also involves the development of new emergent properties, in accordance with Bunge's emergent materialism. Each level involves systems, with components, structures and mechanisms, and an environment. This dimension can be studied with natural scientific methods. The second dimension is the subjective-experiential realities, and refers to our subjective perspective on the world. In accordance with Husserl's phenomenology, it is argued that this subjectivity does not exist in the world (i.e., should not be reified as an object among other objects), but represents a perspective on the world that we enter in our capacity as conscious human beings. Essential characteristics of this subjectivity (such as intentionality, temporality, embodiment, and intersubjectivity) can be explored by phenomenological methods. The third dimension is the social-constructional realities, and includes social institutions, norms, categories, theories, and techniques. It is argued that psychological science spans over all three dimensions. Although almost all psychological research by necessity starts from a problem formulation where the subjective-experiential dimension plays an essential role (either explicitly or implicitly), most of present-day psychological research clearly emphasizes the material dimension. It is argued that a mature psychological science needs to integrate all three dimensions.

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Section: Functions Not Experiencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Functions Not Experiencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generalizing from Case Studies: A Commentary

Saint-Georges

2017

Integr. psych. behav.

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“…He was of the opinion that the will can result in thoughts that are based both on sensorial experiences and self creative imagination, and that thoughts can actually move the brain. Since his time, the Cartesian mind have been replaced by a more modern concept of consciousness and the brain has took the place of the body to form the “hard problem of consciousness” as defined by the philosopher David Chalmers (Chalmers, 1995). It has been often said that consciousness is an illusion (e.g., Dennett, 1992) and so is free will (e.g., Wegner, 2002).…”

Section: Consciousness Brain Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Levine (1983) has introduced the term “the explanatory gap” and later Chalmers (1995) has coined “the hard problem of consciousness,” both expressed the opinion that consciousness has a subjective basis that can not be observed and experienced by a third party neither can it be explained by reductive methods—namely by empirical sciences. According to them, it is possible to describe processes in the brain in a scientific objective way, based on observations, but it is not possible to describe personal experience in such a way.…”

Section: Consciousness Brain Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness, brain, neuroplasticity

Askenasy

Lehmann

2013

Front. Psychol.

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Subjectivity, intentionality, self-awareness and will are major components of consciousness in human beings. Changes in consciousness and its content following different brain processes and malfunction have long been studied. Cognitive sciences assume that brain activities have an infrastructure, but there is also evidence that consciousness itself may change this infrastructure. The two-way influence between brain and consciousness has been at the center of philosophy and less so, of science. This so-called bottom-up and top-down interrelationship is controversial and is the subject of our article. We would like to ask: how does it happen that consciousness may provoke structural changes in the brain? The living brain means continuous changes at the synaptic level with every new experience, with every new process of learning, memorizing or mastering new and existing skills. Synapses are generated and dissolved, while others are preserved, in an ever-changing process of so-called neuroplasticity. Ongoing processes of synaptic reinforcements and decay occur during wakefulness when consciousness is present, but also during sleep when it is mostly absent. We suggest that consciousness influences brain neuroplasticity both during wakefulness as well as sleep in a top-down way. This means that consciousness really activates synaptic flow and changes brain structures and functional organization. The dynamic impact of consciousness on brain never stops despite the relative stationary structure of the brain. Such a process can be a target for medical intervention, e.g., by cognitive training.

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“…A functional isomorphism on the other hand requires the functional connectivity between its component entities (Lehar, 2003). It is an extension to Müller's psychophysical postulate (Müller 1896), and Chalmers' principle of structural coherence (Chalmers 1995).…”

Section: The Importance Of the Study Of Religious Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

Is our brain hardwired to produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive God? A systematic review on the role of the brain in mediating religious experience

Fingelkurts

2009

Cogn Process

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To figure out whether the main empirical question "Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?" is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), allowing consciousness/mind/spirit and brain/body/matter to be seen as different sides of the same phenomenon, neither reducible to each other. The emergence of a form of causation distinctive from physics where mental/conscious agency (a) is neither identical with nor reducible to brain processes and (b) does exert "downward" causal influence on brain plasticity and the various levels of brain functioning is discussed. This manuscript also discusses the role of cognitive processes in religious experience and outlines what can neuroscience offer for study of religious experience and what is the significance of this study for neuroscience, clinicians, theology and philosophy. A methodological shift from "explanation" to "description" of religious experience is suggested. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion between theologians, cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists.

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Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

Cited by 589 publications

References 24 publications

Generalizing from Case Studies: A Commentary

Generalizing from Case Studies: A Commentary

Consciousness, brain, neuroplasticity

Is our brain hardwired to produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive God? A systematic review on the role of the brain in mediating religious experience

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