The Journal of Social Psychology

1996

DOI: 10.1080/00224545.1996.9712244

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Factors Affecting the Use of Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability

¹

,

Lora Maceachern

²

,

Elaine S. Stoffer

³

et al.

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Hypothesis 4: Probabilistic1

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Cited by 12 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…. .other relevant mechanisms may have yet to be identified.” One additional study showed that the Wells Effect was not diminished when mock jurors made their decisions as a group or when they were given extended time to render their verdict (Wright, MacEachern, Stoffer, & MacDonald, ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Disjunction Between Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making

¹

,

Shoots‐Reinhard

²

,

³

2011

Behavioral Decision Making

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Although the law assumes a close relation between the probability that a defendant committed the act in question and the ensuing verdict of the jurors, prior research has shown this assumption to be often violated. We present five experiments designed to show that factors that influence probability also influence verdict, but other factors are capable of directly producing changes in verdict without affecting probability. In Experiment 1, we replicated the Wells Effect; scenarios generating the same probability that the Blue Bus Company was to blame for the same accident, nevertheless, generated significantly different likelihoods of finding the defendant liable. In Experiment 2, we showed that equally diagnostic affirmative and negative evidence had differential effects on mock jurors' probability estimates and verdicts. In Experiment 3, we showed that a completely nondiagnostic witness, who either implicates the same bus company or a different bus company as did a diagnostic witness, significantly influenced mock jurors' verdicts. However, the nondiagnostic witness did not change the probability that the Blue Bus Company was responsible for the accident. In Experiment 4, we demonstrated that base rate and witness reliability information resulted in very similar probability estimates but radically different verdicts. In Experiment 5, we showed that a change in the diagnosticity of the evidence influenced both probability and verdict with the former mediating differences in the later. Because probability is only one of the several determinants of the verdict, the two dependent variables are not as closely related as the law presumes.

“…. .other relevant mechanisms may have yet to be identified.” One additional study showed that the Wells Effect was not diminished when mock jurors made their decisions as a group or when they were given extended time to render their verdict (Wright, MacEachern, Stoffer, & MacDonald, ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Disjunction Between Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making

¹

,

Shoots‐Reinhard

²

,

³

2011

Behavioral Decision Making

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although the law assumes a close relation between the probability that a defendant committed the act in question and the ensuing verdict of the jurors, prior research has shown this assumption to be often violated. We present five experiments designed to show that factors that influence probability also influence verdict, but other factors are capable of directly producing changes in verdict without affecting probability. In Experiment 1, we replicated the Wells Effect; scenarios generating the same probability that the Blue Bus Company was to blame for the same accident, nevertheless, generated significantly different likelihoods of finding the defendant liable. In Experiment 2, we showed that equally diagnostic affirmative and negative evidence had differential effects on mock jurors' probability estimates and verdicts. In Experiment 3, we showed that a completely nondiagnostic witness, who either implicates the same bus company or a different bus company as did a diagnostic witness, significantly influenced mock jurors' verdicts. However, the nondiagnostic witness did not change the probability that the Blue Bus Company was responsible for the accident. In Experiment 4, we demonstrated that base rate and witness reliability information resulted in very similar probability estimates but radically different verdicts. In Experiment 5, we showed that a change in the diagnosticity of the evidence influenced both probability and verdict with the former mediating differences in the later. Because probability is only one of the several determinants of the verdict, the two dependent variables are not as closely related as the law presumes.

“…Finally, there is the question of whether RMPs alone are inherently capable of establishing proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Roth (2010) presents compelling normative arguments in favor of an affirmative answer, and speculates that jurors would probably convict on the basis of a trawl match alone, citing the study by Wright et al. (1996) demonstrating that the Wells effect dissipates when the probability approaches 99.9 percent.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One explanation for the apparent disjunction is that participants are manifesting the Wells effect (Niedermeier et al. 1999; Wright et al. 1996).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trawling Genetic Databases: When a DNA Match is Just a Naked Statistic

¹

,

²

2011

J Empirical Legal Studies

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Genetic databases are highly controversial. Significant controversy followed a report by the National Research Council (1996) concluding that a DNA match resulting from a database trawl is less probative than when only a single test is conducted. Legal scholars and statisticians have demonstrated why this conclusion is specious, but there is no empirical research examining what impact a trawl match has on jurors. The current experiment demonstrates that mock jurors are less likely to convict when a DNA match arises from a database trawl compared to a conventional confirmation case. Interestingly, however, the probability judgments of guilt did not differ between the cases. The Wells effect (Wells 1992) is consistent with this disjunction, where a trawl match is more likely to be viewed as naked statistical evidence that influences the perception of guilt but not guilty verdicts. A second study examined mock jurors' perceptions of the arguments advanced by the Bayesian and frequentist camps over the probative value of trawl matches. The frequentist argument led to fewer convictions, while the Bayesian argument increased the conviction rate, as expected. The Bayesian argument also attenuated the Wells effect. Implications for the introduction of trawl matches are considered in light of these findings.

“…When Goodman (1992) compared the weight mock jurors placed on the statistical evidence to a Bayesian analysis, which predicted how much weight jurors should have given that evidence, she found that mock jurors underused the scientific evidence in reaching a verdict. Additional research by Wright, MacEachern, Stoffer, and MacDonald (1996) supported Goodman's findings and suggested that people do not understand statistical evidence and, therefore, are reluctant to use it when rendering a verdict.…”

mentioning

confidence: 84%

Effects of DNA and Eyewitness Evidence on Juror Decisions

2001

PsiChiJournal

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The present experiment investigated whether DNA evidence, eyewitness evidence, or a combination of both was more persuasive to mock jurors. The study also explored whether varying the credibility of the testimony affected persuasiveness. The researchers hypothesized that the combination of eyewitness and DNA evidence would be the most persuasive to jurors. Eyewitness evidence would be more persuasive than DNA evidence, and credible testimony would be more persuasive than discredited testimony. One hundred-fifty college students read an excerpt from a court transcript describing a first-degree murder trial. Participants rendered a verdict and answered questions concerning confidence, understanding, reliability, and persuasiveness of testimony. The analyses partly supported the hypotheses. DNA evidence was more persuasive, reliable, influential, and less likely to be viewed as wrong than eyewitness evidence, regardless of whether it was discredited. DNA evidence elicited more guilty verdicts, and jurors were more confident in their verdict. We discuss these results in light of the 2-routes-to-persuasion theory.

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