Implicit causality might enable readers to focus on the imputed cause of an event and make it the default referent of a following pronoun. Alternatively, its effects might arise only when a following explicit cause is integrated with a description of the event. In three probe recognition experiments, in which the participants in the events were of the same sex, the only reliable effect -apart from the advantage of first mention -was that of whether implicit and explicit causes were the same. This effect was independent of whether the probe named the referent of the pronoun. In a fourth experiment, in which the two participants were of different sexes, there was no simple effect of implicit causality, but there was an advantage for the pronoun's referent. These results are consistent with the view that implicit causality has its effects at integration. We discuss their broader implications for theories of comprehension.There is a growing consensus that mental representations of the content of text take the form of discourse models (e.g., Garnham, 1981Garnham, , 1987Johnson-Laird & Garnham, 1980;Greene, McKoon, & Ratcliff, 1992;Stenning, 1978;Webber, 1979) and that the primary goal of a theory of text comprehension is to specify the nature of such models and of the processes that construct them. Discourse models contain representations of people, things, events (in the broad sense of that term used in semantic theory; see e.g., Frawley, 1992, in which it covers acts, actions, states, and processes), and so on, in the real, or an imaginary, world. However, beyond this basic specification, there is considerable disagreement about their nature and about the mental processes that build them. One important issue is the extent to which discourse models are elaborated using information that is not explicit in a text, but which must be derived inferentially (see e.g., , vs Garnham, 1992, and Glenberg & Mathew, 1992. Another set of issues, and one that has received less attention in the psychological literature, concerns the internal structure of discourse models. These issues, which can loosely be dubbed "issues-of focus," are crucial to online theories Address correspondence and reprint requests to Alan Garnham, Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9QG, United Kingdom. Tele-phone: +44 1273 678337. Fax: +44 1273 678611. alang@epunix.sussex.ac.uk.
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Author Manuscript Author ManuscriptAuthor ManuscriptAuthor Manuscript of text comprehension, because the internal structure of discourse models determines which parts of those models are most available in memory. It is one of these issues that we address in this paper.Some of the things mentioned in a text are in focus and, therefore, readily available for later reference, and others are not. Both local, sentence level, and global, discourse level, mechanisms may contribute to whether an item is in focus and hence can readily be referred to again (e.g., using a pronoun). However, the details of these mechanisms rema...