The more prepared people are, the less harm they will suffer when disaster strikes. Yet anecdotal and empirical evidence shows that people overestimate their preparedness and are underprepared. While a robust literature has matured around hazards, risk, and vulnerability, and disaster policy, politics, and management, the literature about individual preparedness is much more limited and inconsistent. We know little about why people prepare (or why they do not), and what would make them prepare more. As a result, public managers are at a loss about how to design effective preparedness programs. In this paper, we survey the literature on preparedness to crystallize the gaps in our understanding of when and how citizens react to the threat of disaster. We then examine and compare the views of risk and preparedness held by individuals and government officials drawing on insights from a 4-year study that involved three national surveys and intensive studies in two communities. We use this analysis to address two questions: What do citizens think and do about risks and preparedness, and why? How do local government officials understand what citizens think and do about risks and preparedness?
Keywords natural disasters, preparedness, risk perceptionsOne of government's primary responsibilities is to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. This presents a policy challenge, since communities face multiple, complex hazards, illustrated by the present economic crisis, the continuing threat of terrorism, and the prevalence of major natural disasters. Likewise, citizens share responsibility for their own protection, by taking protective actions and avoiding the harms that may befall them. The more prepared people are, the less harm they will suffer when disaster strikes. Moreover, when citizen preparation and government efforts are in sync, then communities are more resilient to hazards. When citizens and governments are not aligned, dealing with the aftermath of hazards is slower and more expensive.The scholarly literature and the anecdotal experience of public officials show that people do not understand the risks they face, are not prepared enough for major disasters, and often overestimate their preparedness. Yet we know little about why people prepare (or why they do not), and