Factors that determine the reputation of private equity managers in developing markets

Balboa, Marina; Martí, José

doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2006.05.004

Cited by 90 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 76 publications

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“…7 conduct and so institutional ownership conveys a credible signal to the market. Finally, Balboa and Martí (2007) showed that private equity managers were able to raise more funds if they were a member of the national private equity association because such membership governed managerial behavior, thus sending a credible signal to investors.…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Online Shadow of Offline Signals: Which Sellers Get Contacted in Online B2B Marketplaces?

Lanzolla

Frankort

2016

AMJ

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Abstract:This article extends the understanding of what impels buyers to contact particular sellers in online business-to-business (B2B) marketplaces, which are typically characterized by sparse social structures and concomitant limitations in observing social cues. Integrating an institutional perspective with signaling theory, our core argument is that offline seller characteristics that are visible online-in particular, geographic location and legal statusconvey credible signals of seller behavior because they provide buyers with information on sellers' local institutional quality and the institutionallyinduced obligations and controls acting on sellers. Using unique data from a large Italian online B2B marketplace between the fourth quarter of 1999 and July 2001, we find that both sellers' local institutional quality and their legal statuses affect a buyer's likelihood of contacting a seller. Moreover, consistent with the idea that a buyer's own local institutional quality generates a relevant reference point against which sellers are evaluated, we find that a buyer is progressively more likely to contact sellers the higher their local institutional quality relative to the buyer. Jointly, our findings imply that in online B2B marketplaces, signals conveyed by sellers' geographic locations and legal statuses may be substantive sources of competitive heterogeneity and market segmentation. Academy of Management JournalThe Forthcoming, Academy of Management Journal * Both authors contributed equally to the research in this article. Associate Editor Heli Wang provided excellent guidance and three anonymous reviewers provided detailed and constructive comments and suggestions. We thank the B2B marketplace for sharing proprietary data, Kaizad Doctor for research assistance, Francesco Calderoni for advice on the measurement of corruption and organized crime in Italy, Enrico Spaziani at the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) for advice on Italian territorial statistics, and Marco Bitetto, Daniela Latorre, and Tecla Ubaldi for generous advice on Italian commercial law. We also thank Argyro Avgoustaki, Charles Baden-Fuller, Mariachiara Barzotto, Gokhan Ertug, Igor Filatotchev, Santi Furnari, Stefan Haefliger, Wilko Letterie, Joanne Oxley, Carol Saunders, and audiences at Ca' Foscari University of Venice, HEC Lausanne, Singapore Management University, University of Groningen, and Warwick Business School for helpful comments and discussions related to this article. A predecessor version of this study was presented at the 2013 Academy of Management Annual Conference in Lake Buena Vista, Florida. During part of the research for this article, Gianvito Lanzolla was a Visiting Scholar at London Business School and Hans Frankort was a Visiting Scholar at the University of Toronto's Joseph L. Rotman School of Management. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support received at these two institutions.

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Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Online Shadow of Offline Signals: Which Sellers Get Contacted in Online B2B Marketplaces?

Lanzolla

Frankort

2016

AMJ

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“…H-1.1: Presence of BA is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing VC entities in contrast to BA investors are rarely principals (owners) of their own investment funds and are commonly agents acting on behalf of their own principal investors (Balboa and Marti, 2007).…”

Section: Consequently I Test the Following Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…H-4.1: Business Angel retained ownership is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing Foreign VC managers have a similar degree of independence in terms of their decision making although this arises from having their being agents with principals located overseas (see Balboa and Marti (2007) for full review of agency in VC investment) and not subject to the cultural and socialized norms of the local indigenous political economy. Consequently foreign VC managers are more likely genuinely focussed on signalling undertaking signals to the market that would be otherwise costly to imitate (see Certo (2003) for full review of signalling).…”

Section: Impact Of Business Angel and Venture Capitalist Retained Ownmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of institutions, ownership structure, business angels, venture capital and lead managers on IPO firm underpricing across North Africa

Hearn

2014

Journal of Multinational Financial Management

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The impact of institutions, ownership structure, business angels, venture capital and lead managers on IPO firm underpricing across North Africa Copyright and reuse:Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available.Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. 1The impact of institutions, ownership structure, business angels, venture capital and lead managers on IPO firm underpricing across North Africa Bruce Hearn* University of Sussex AbstractKeywords:

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“…In addition, the role played by intermediaries in financial markets such as venture capitalists is hardly disputed (Balboa & Marti, 2007;Lim & Cu, 2012;Wright, Robbie, & Ennew, 1997). The expansion of venture capital is now a worldwide phenomenon (Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2007;Wright, 2007).…”

Section: What Do Entrepreneurs Do?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Entrepreneurs as intermediaries

Peng

Lee

Hong

2014

Journal of World Business

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[Acknowledgment] We thank John Slocum (editor) and two reviewers for their guidance, and Dane Blevins, Omer Gokalp, Sergey Lebedev, Craig Macaulay, Canan Mutlu, Steve Sauerwald, Ciprian Stan, Weichieh Su for their helpful comments. This research was supported in part by a National Science Foundation CAREER Grant (SES 0238820) and the Jindal Chair at UT Dallas. The views are ours and not necessarily those of the underwriters. 2 Entrepreneurs as Intermediaries [Abstract]This paper sketches the contours of a theory of entrepreneurship focusing on the nature of entrepreneurship as intermediation under information asymmetries. While entrepreneurship, strategy, and finance researchers have studied the relationship between entrepreneurs and intermediaries, they tend to treat intermediaries, such as venture capitalists, as a separate organizational form that is parallel with (start-up) entrepreneurs. In this paper, we consider entrepreneurs as intermediaries who discover, create, and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities by bearing uncertainties stemming from intermediation between potential buyers and sellers under information asymmetries. Specifically, we focus on two key questions in entrepreneurship research: (1) Why do entrepreneurs arise and exist at all? (2) Why do some entrepreneurs perform better than others in creating entrepreneurial opportunities, and ultimately creating wealth? Our discussion culminates in a new research agenda with four testable propositions.3

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Factors that determine the reputation of private equity managers in developing markets

Cited by 90 publications

References 76 publications

The Online Shadow of Offline Signals: Which Sellers Get Contacted in Online B2B Marketplaces?

The Online Shadow of Offline Signals: Which Sellers Get Contacted in Online B2B Marketplaces?

The impact of institutions, ownership structure, business angels, venture capital and lead managers on IPO firm underpricing across North Africa

Entrepreneurs as intermediaries

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