Failure Mode Reasoning in Model Based Safety Analysis

Jahanian, Hamid; Parker, David; Zeller, Marc; McIver, Annabelle; Papadopoulos, Yiannis

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-58920-2_9

Cited by 7 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The above equation means that if the output o is False by fault then either one of its inputs to the OR gate, i.e., 8 shows the results of FOR P V , FOR ST EAM , and SAIDI based on FMR analysis using the assumed failure rates of the power plant components. According to Jahanian et al [11], the soundness of the obtained FMR equations (Eq. 21 to Eq.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Formal FT-based Cause-Consequence Reliability Analysis using Theorem Proving

Abdelghany,

Tahar

2021

Preprint

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Cause-consequence Diagram (CCD) is widely used as a deductive safety analysis technique for decision-making at the critical-system design stage. This approach models the causes of subsystem failures in a highly-critical system and their potential consequences using Fault Tree (FT) and Event Tree (ET) methods, which are well-known dependability modeling techniques. Paperand-pencil-based approaches and simulation tools, such as the Monte-Carlo approach, are commonly used to carry out CCD analysis, but lack the ability to rigorously verify essential system reliability properties. In this work, we propose to use formal techniques based on theorem proving for the formal modeling and step-analysis of CCDs to overcome the inaccuracies of the simulation-based analysis and the error-proneness of informal reasoning by mathematical proofs. In particular, we use the HOL4 theorem prover, which is a computer-based mathematical reasoning tool. To this end, we developed a formalization of CCDs in Higher-Order Logic (HOL), based on the algebraic approach, using HOL4. We demonstrate the practical effectiveness of the proposed CCD formalization by performing the formal reliability analysis of the IEEE 39-bus electrical power network. Also, we formally determine the Forced Outage Rate (FOR) of the power generation units and the network reliability index, i.e., System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI). To assess the accuracy of our proposed approach, we compare our results with those obtained with MATLAB Monte-Carlo Simulation (MCS) as well as other state-of-the-art approaches for subsystem-level reliability analysis.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, Jahanian in [10] has proposed a new technique called Failure Mode Reasoning (FMR) for identifying and quantifying the failure modes for safety-critical systems at the subsystem level. However, according to Jahanian [11], the soundness of the FMR approach needs to be proven mathematically.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal FT-based Cause-Consequence Reliability Analysis using Theorem Proving

Abdelghany,

Tahar

2021

Preprint

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show abstract

“…where Table 8 shows the probabilistic results of FOR PV , FOR STEAM , and SAIDI based on FMR analysis using the assumed failure rates of the power plant components. According to Jahanian et al [11], the soundness of the obtained FMR equations (Eq. 6 to Eq.…”

Section: ) F or Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, Jahanian in [10] has proposed a new technique called Failure Mode Reasoning (FMR) for identifying and quantifying the failure modes for safetycritical systems at the subsystem level. However, according to Jahanian et al [11], the soundness of the FMR approach needs to be proven mathematically.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cause-Consequence Diagram Reliability Analysis Using Formal Techniques With Application to Electrical Power Networks

Abdelghany

Tahar

2021

IEEE Access

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Cause-consequence Diagram (CCD) is widely used as a deductive safety analysis technique for decision-making at the critical-system design stage. This approach models the causes of subsystem failures in a highly-critical system and their potential consequences using Fault Tree (FT) and Event Tree (ET) methods, which are well-known dependability modeling techniques. Paper-and-pencil-based approaches and simulation tools, such as the Monte-Carlo approach, are commonly used to carry out CCD analysis, but lack the ability to rigorously verify essential system reliability properties. In this paper, we propose to use formal techniques based on theorem proving for the formal modeling and step-analysis of CCDs to overcome the inaccuracies of the simulation-based analysis and the error-proneness of informal reasoning by mathematical proofs. In particular, we use the HOL4 theorem prover, which is a computer-based mathematical reasoning tool. To this end, we developed a formalization of CCDs in Higher-Order Logic (HOL), based on the algebraic approach, using HOL4. We demonstrate the practical effectiveness of the proposed CCD formalization by performing the formal reliability analysis of the IEEE 39-bus electrical power network. Also, we formally determine the Forced Outage Rate (FOR) of the power generation units and the network reliability index, i.e., System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI). To assess the accuracy of our proposed approach, we compare our results with those obtained with MATLAB Monte-Carlo Simulation (MCS) as well as other state-of-the-art approaches for subsystem-level reliability analysis.

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“…In a more recent project [18] we examined a larger case study where we integrated FMR with other model-base analysis methods HiP-HOPS [26] and CFT [20]. We demonstrated that not only is FMR able to handle larger examples with precision, but its output can also be of value to other safety analysis tools that are designed to model generic systems but not programs.…”

Section: Fmr In Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning with failures

Jahanian,

McIver

2020

Preprint

Self Cite

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Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) protect major hazard facilities, e.g. power plants, against catastrophic accidents. An SIS consists of hardware components and a controller software -the "program". Current safety analyses of SIS' include the construction of a fault tree, summarising potential faults of the components and how they can arise within an SIS. The exercise of identifying faults typically relies on the experience of the safety engineer. Unfortunately the program part is often too complicated to be analysed in such a "by hand" manner and so the impact it has on the resulting safety analysis is not accurately captured. In this paper we demonstrate how a formal model for faults and failure modes can be used to analyse the impact of an SIS program. We outline the underlying concepts of Failure Mode Reasoning and its application in safety analysis, and we illustrate the ideas on a practical example.

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Failure Mode Reasoning in Model Based Safety Analysis

Cited by 7 publications

References 8 publications

Formal FT-based Cause-Consequence Reliability Analysis using Theorem Proving

Formal FT-based Cause-Consequence Reliability Analysis using Theorem Proving

Cause-Consequence Diagram Reliability Analysis Using Formal Techniques With Application to Electrical Power Networks

Reasoning with failures

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