Fair Computation with Rational Players

Groce, Adam; Katz, Jonathan

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_7

Cited by 70 publications

(91 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Applications of cryptography to game theory include the works of [39,1,2,62]. More directly related to secure computation are the works of [75,57,58,55,60,88,71]. Protocols for multiparty lottery are also designed in [70,4,11].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Use Bitcoin to Design Fair Protocols

Bentov

Kumaresan

2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

275

252

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We study a model of fairness in secure computation in which an adversarial party that aborts on receiving output is forced to pay a mutually predefined monetary penalty. We then show how the Bitcoin network can be used to achieve the above notion of fairness in the two-party as well as the multiparty setting (with a dishonest majority). In particular, we propose new ideal functionalities and protocols for fair secure computation and fair lottery in this model.One of our main contributions is the definition of an ideal primitive, which we call F CR (CR stands for "claim-or-refund"), that formalizes and abstracts the exact properties we require from the Bitcoin network to achieve our goals. Naturally, this abstraction allows us to design fair protocols in a hybrid model in which parties have access to the F CR functionality, and is otherwise independent of the Bitcoin ecosystem. We also show an efficient realization of F CR that requires only two Bitcoin transactions to be made on the network.Our constructions also enjoy high efficiency. In a multiparty setting, our protocols only require a constant number of calls to F CR per party on top of a standard multiparty secure computation protocol. Our fair multiparty lottery protocol improves over previous solutions which required a quadratic number of Bitcoin transactions.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Use Bitcoin to Design Fair Protocols

Bentov

Kumaresan

2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

275

252

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“…Relaxed Fairness: Because of the impossibility result on general fairness, alternative definitions arise as partial fairness [26,5,34,30] and fairness in rational settings [55,35,36,50,1,56].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficiently Making Secure Two-Party Computation Fair

Kılınç

Küpçü

2017

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Secure two-party computation cannot be fair against malicious adversaries, unless a trusted third party (TTP) or a gradual-release type super-constant round protocol is employed. Existing optimistic fair two-party computation protocols with constant rounds are either too costly to arbitrate (e.g., the TTP may need to re-do almost the whole computation), or require the use of electronic payments. Furthermore, most of the existing solutions were proven secure and fair via a partial simulation, which, we show, may lead to insecurity overall. We propose a new framework for fair and secure two-party computation that can be applied on top of any secure two party computation protocol based on Yao's garbled circuits and zero-knowledge proofs. We show that our fairness overhead is minimal, compared to all known existing work. Furthermore, our protocol is fair even in terms of the work performed by Alice and Bob. We also prove our protocol is fair and secure simultaneously, through one simulator, which guarantees that our fairness extensions do not leak any private information. Lastly, we ensure that the TTP never learns the inputs or outputs of the computation. Therefore, even if the TTP becomes malicious and causes unfairness by colluding with one party, the security of the underlying protocol is still preserved.

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“…Again, this is in vain, as the reveal your view deviation is played after both a 1 and a 2 are fully revealed. For the same reason techniques for fair computation between rational players will fail too, like the protocol in Groce and Katz [10].…”

Section: Ne-punishable Ce Versus Empty-threat Free Nementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The verification is analogous for any advice that player A(player B) gets such that the two action profiles selected with non-zero probability in the corresponding row(column) are equiprobable. 10 Now consider the advice a k−1 of player A. It should hold that…”

Section: Details For Sectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Limits on the Power of Cryptographic Cheap Talk

Hubáček

Nielsen

Rosen

2013

Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2013

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We revisit the question of whether cryptographic protocols can replace correlated equilibria mediators in two-player strategic games. This problem was first addressed by Dodis, Halevi and Rabin (CRYPTO 2000), who suggested replacing the mediator with a secure protocol and proved that their solution is stable in the Nash equilibrium (NE) sense, provided that the players are computationally bounded.We show that there exist two-player games for which no cryptographic protocol can implement the mediator in a sequentially rational way; that is, without introducing empty threats. This explains why all solutions so far were either sequentially unstable, or were restricted to a limited class of correlated equilibria (specifically, those that do not dominate any NE, and hence playing them does not offer a clear advantage over playing any NE).In the context of computational NE, we classify necessary and sufficient cryptographic assumptions for implementing a mediator that allows to achieve a given utility profile of a correlated equilibrium. The picture that emerges is somewhat different than the one arising in semi-honest secure two-party computation. Specifically, while in the latter case every functionality is either "complete" (i.e., implies Oblivious Transfer) or "trivial" (i.e., can be securely computed unconditionally), in the former there exist some "intermediate" utility profiles whose implementation is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions.

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Fair Computation with Rational Players

Cited by 70 publications

References 34 publications

How to Use Bitcoin to Design Fair Protocols

How to Use Bitcoin to Design Fair Protocols

Efficiently Making Secure Two-Party Computation Fair

Limits on the Power of Cryptographic Cheap Talk

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